Chapter iii  Right to a Hearing by a Competent, Independent and Impartial Tribunal Established by Law 57 obligation of independence and impartiality.190 The Human Rights Committee has similarly concluded that it is not in principle for the Committee to review specific instructions to the jury by the trial judge, unless it can be ascertained that the instructions were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, or that the judge manifestly violated her/his obligation of impartiality.191 3.2.2 Competence to make a binding decision The function of a court or tribunal is to determine matters within its competent jurisdiction (See also 3.2.3).192 This means that a tribunal must be able to make a binding decision that cannot be altered by a non-judicial authority to the detriment of an individual party,193 something described by the European Court of Human Rights as inherent to the very notion of a judicial tribunal.194 The power to give a binding decision can be also seen as a component of the “independence” of the tribunal (See also 3.3.1).195 3.2.3 Jurisdictional competence of courts and tribunals The final aspect of “competence” is that there may be a duty on a State to establish a court, or to extend the jurisdiction of an existing court, to deal with matters in respect of which there is no existing right of recourse to the courts. This overlaps with the right of access to courts and tribunals (See also 2.1.1). In its General Comment on fair trial standards, the Human Rights Committee has explained that: “The failure of a State party to establish a competent tribunal to determine… rights and obligations or to allow access to… a tribunal in specific cases would amount to a violation of article 14 if such limitations are not based on domestic legislation, are not necessary to pursue legitimate aims such as the proper administration of justice, or are based on exceptions from jurisdiction deriving from international law such, for example, as immunities, or if the access left to an individual would be limited to an extent that would undermine the very essence of the right.”196 190 See, for example: Simms v Jamaica, HRC Communication 541/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/53/D/541/1993 (1995), para 6.2; Romanov v Ukraine, HRC Communication 842/1998, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/D/842/1998 (2003), para 6.4; Schedko v. Belarus, HRC Communication 886/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/77/D/886/1999 (2003), para 9.3; Martínez Mercader et al. v Spain, HRC Communication 1097/2002, UN Doc CCPR/ C/84/D/1097/2002 (2005), para 6.3; Arenz et al. v Germany, HRC Communication 1138/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/80/D/1138/2002 (2004), para 8.6; and Riedl-Riedenstein et al. v Germany, HRC Communication 1188/2003, UN Doc CCPR/C/88/D/1188/2003 (2007) para 7.3. 191 Kelly v Jamaica, HRC Communication 253/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 (1991), para 5.13. 192 Sramek v Austria [1984] ECHR 12, para 36. 193 Van de Hurk v the Netherlands [1994] ECHR 14, para 45; Findlay v the United Kingdom [1997] ECHR 8, para 77; and Morris v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 162, para 73. 194 Morris v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 162, para 73; Findlay v the United Kingdom [1997] ECHR 8, para 77; Van de Hurk v the Netherlands [1994] ECHR 14, para 45. 195 Morris v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 162, para 73; Findlay v the United Kingdom [1997] ECHR 8, para 77; Van de Hurk v the Netherlands [1994] ECHR 14, para 45. 196 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 18.