Chapter iii  Right to a Hearing by a Competent, Independent and Impartial Tribunal Established by Law 61 any conflicts of interest and accessibility of the place of hearings for the parties. Although it is not the role of the European Court of Human Rights to assess whether there were valid grounds for the domestic authorities to assign a case to a particular judge or court, the Court has taken the view that it must be satisfied that such assignments are compatible with Article 6(1) of ECHR.216 The final requirement of an outward appearance of independence may involve hypothetical possibilities of interference. The mere possibility of influence will be sufficient to undermine the independence of the judiciary. In Belilos v Switzerland, for example, the fact that a member of the Police Board was a serving police officer was seen as undermining the appearance of independence, despite the fact that the officer (as a lawyer working at police headquarters) was not subject to orders, was appointed to act in his personal capacity and could not be dismissed prior to the expiry of his term of office. The European Court of Human Rights, nevertheless, took the view that: “The ordinary citizen will tend to see him as a member of the police force subordinate to his superiors and loyal to his colleagues. A situation of this kind may undermine the confidence which must be inspired by the courts in a democratic society.”217 In Öcalan v Turkey, the replacement of the military judge by a civilian judge in the course of the proceedings did not remedy the situation, as the European Court of Human Rights held that the court must be seen to be independent of the executive and the legislature at each of the three stages of the proceedings, namely the investigation, the trial and the verdict.218 Should the personal prejudice of a judge, or the practice of a court in the treatment of accused persons, result in the adverse treatment of an accused in a criminal trial, this may amount to a violation of the presumption of innocence (See also 5.1). 3.3.2 Impartiality of a tribunal It is of fundamental importance in a democratic society that the courts inspire confidence in the public.219 To that end, both the ICCPR and ECHR require a tribunal falling within the scope of Articles 14 and 6 respectively to be impartial. The requirement of impartiality has two features: first, that judges do not allow their judgment to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them – referred to as subjective impartiality; and, second, that the tribunal must also appear to the reasonable observer to be impartial – referred to as objective impartiality.220 The European Court 216 Bochan v Ukraine [2007] ECHR, para 71; Moiseyev v Russia [2008] ECHR 1031, para 176. 217 Belilos v Switzerland [1998] ECHR 4, para 67. See also Sramek v Austria [1984] ECHR 12, paras 41–42; and Öcalan v Turkey [2005] ECHR 282, paras 114, 118. 218 Öcalan v Turkey [2005] ECHR 282, paras 114,118. 219 Padovani v Italy [1993] ECHR 12, para 27; Kyprianou v Cyprus [2005] ECHR 873, para 118; Farhi v France [2007] ECHR 5562, para 23; Jasinski v Poland [2005] ECHR 883, para 53. 220 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 21; Karttunen v Finland, HRC Communication 387/1989, UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989 (1992), para 7.2; Perterer v Austria, HRC Communication 1015/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/1015/2001 (2004), paras 10.2–10.4; Castedo v Spain, HRC Communication 1122/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/94/1122/2002 (2008), para 9.5; Piersack v Belgium