Chapter iii Right to a Hearing by a Competent, Independent and Impartial
Tribunal Established by Law
71
In De Polay v Peru, the Committee articulated the following view:
“As to Mr. Polay Campos’ trial and conviction on 3 April 1993 by a special tribunal
of ‘faceless judges’, no information was made available by the State Party, in spite
of the Committee’s request to this effect in the admissibility decision of 15 March
1996. As indicated by the Committee in its preliminary comments of 25 July 1996
on the Third Periodic Report of Peru and its Concluding Observations of 6 November 1996… such trials by special tribunals composed of anonymous judges are
incompatible with article 14 of the Covenant. It cannot be held against the author
that she furnished little information about her husband’s trial; in fact, the very
nature of the system of trials by ‘faceless judges’ in a remote prison is predicated on
the exclusion of the public from the proceedings. In this situation, the defendants
do not know who the judges trying them are and unacceptable impediments are
created to their preparation of their defence and communication with their lawyers. Moreover, this system fails to guarantee a cardinal aspect of a fair trial within
the meaning of article 14 of the Covenant: that the tribunal must be, and be seen to
be, independent and impartial. In a system of trial by ‘faceless judges’, neither the
independence nor the impartiality of the judges is guaranteed, since the tribunal,
being established ad hoc, may comprise serving members of the armed forces. In
the Committee’s opinion, such a system also fails to safeguard the presumption of
innocence, which is guaranteed by article 14, paragraph 2. In the circumstances of
the case, the Committee concludes that paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 (b) and (d) of article
14 of the Covenant were violated.” 280
Thus, the complete circumstances in which trials by faceless judges are conducted must be
taken into account. Having said so, the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on
fair trial rights points to the practical reality that, even if the identity of judges is independently verified, such courts often suffer from other irregularities and infers that it should,
therefore, be vigilant when considering the independence and impartiality of such courts.281
In Más v Peru, for example, the author’s trial was conducted by a court comprising faceless judges, in a situation where he did not have an opportunity to question witnesses (See
also 6.7) and his lawyer had received threats (See also 6.6.4), resulting in a finding of a violation of Article 14.282
280 De Polay v Peru, HRC Communication 577/1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 (1998), para 8.8.
281 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 23.
282 Más v Peru, HRC Communication 1058/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1058/2002 (2005), para 6.4. See
also Roque v Peru, HRC Communication 1125/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1125/2002 (2005), para 7.3;
Alegre v Peru, HRC Communication 1126/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002 (2005), para 7.5; Barney
v Colombia, HRC Communication 1298/2004, UN Doc CCPR/C/87/D/1298/2004 (2006), para 7.2; and
Guerra de la Espriella v Colombia, HRC Communication 1623/2007, UN Doc CCPR/C/98/D/1623/2007
(2010), para 9.2.
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