CEDAW/C/50/D/26/2010 author in Mexico – notably five brothers and sisters in addition to her parents – and the possibility that the author could establish herself in another part of the country, or even another part of the Mexico City area than where she had previously lived, in order to avoid the threat of her husband. The Officer also highlighted that although violence persisted, and that according to statistics, 50 per cent of women in Mexico faced violence, various measures are available to affected women, notably, bringing complaints to the police or seeking refuge in shelters for battered women. The State party is of the view that the author’s communication appears to be based primarily on her disagreement with the findings of fact, and recalls that it is not the role of the Committee to re-evaluate such facts and evidence unless it is manifest that the domestic tribunal’s evaluation was arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. According to the State party, the material submitted by the author cannot support a finding that domestic decisions suffered from any such defects. 4.4 The State party’s second argument in support of its contention that the communication should be declared inadmissible relates to the inapplicability of the Convention extraterritorially. The author has alleged that Canada is in violation of the Convention by “allowing Mexico to violate the author’s rights”. According to the State party, Canada cannot be held responsible for any violation of her rights under the Convention, which might occur in Mexico once removed to that country, as this would otherwise imply that Canada has a positive obligation under the Convention not to remove her to a serious risk of discrimination in her country of origin, an obligation which is not contemplated under the Convention. Referring to the Committee’s general recommendation No. 19 (1992),8 which highlights that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination, which could impair or nullify the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the right to life, the right to security of the person or the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the State party nevertheless stresses that it is solely responsible for obligations vis-à-vis individuals under its jurisdiction, and cannot be held responsible for discrimination in the jurisdiction of another State, even if the author could establish that she would be subject to discrimination contrary to the Convention due to gender-based violence in Mexico. Legal obligations against removal to serious violations of human rights are found explicitly in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and in articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While the latter provisions have been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee to protect implicitly against removal to the death penalty and to torture or other similarly serious threats to life and security of the person, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women does not deal directly (or indirectly) with removal to torture or other serious threats to life and the security of the person. The author may only bring a communication concerning Canada related to alleged violations under the Convention committed by and under the jurisdiction of Canada (Optional Protocol, art. 2). In the present case, neither a Canadian official, nor any private person, organization or enterprise under Canada’s jurisdiction has committed a violent act, genderbased or otherwise, against the author. Nor for that matter has the author made any allegation against Canada to that effect. Consequently, the State party contends that the author’s communication is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention and should thus be declared inadmissible by virtue of article 4, paragraph (2) (b), of the Optional Protocol. 4.5 The State party further stresses that the author’s allegation of discrimination is manifestly ill-founded and not sufficiently substantiated, as she failed to show that the decision in her case was due to a failure to pursue a policy of eliminating discrimination against women in Canada (art. 2 of the Convention) and, more specifically, due to a failure to __________________ 8 6 Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 38 (A/47/38), chap. I.