Federal Court of Appeal, if the judge of the Trial Division certifies that the case raises a serious question of general importance. The Appeal Court’s decision is subject to further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The applicant can apply to the Federal Court for an interim order staying removal pending the outcome of his applications and appeals before that Court. 6.3 The State party contends that, like the PDRCC risk assessment in the former legislation, the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment constitutes an effective remedy;j the same has been held by the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights Committee with respect to the remedy of judicial review.k 6.4 In addition, the State party rejects the complainant’s argument that the Federal Court twice acknowledged his risk of being tortured upon return to India, arguing that the stay order of 2 October 1998 and the decision of 24 November 1999 on one of his applications for judicial review cannot be considered judicial findings of fact that the author would be at such a risk. 6.5 The State party challenges the documentary evidence produced by the author, on the basis (a) that the affidavit of Mr. S.S.S., who was able to spend four months in the Punjab in 1997 despite the fact that he had been granted refugee status in Canada, was merely based on statements of the complainant’s family and friends in the Punjab and was as such self-serving and of little weight; (b) that the reports and studies on past human rights violations in the Punjab are insufficient to make out a personal and present risk of torture for the complainant, should he be deported to India; and (c) that the two medical reports of 1995 only referred to previous physical injuries, without making reference to post-traumatic stress disorder, which had been mentioned for the first time in the 1999 report, five years after the complainant made his refugee claim. 7.1 In comments dated 31 March 2003 the complainant reiterates that he would be at a personal and present risk of torture in India, as confirmed by the Federal Court decisions stating that he “would suffer irreparable harm” (staying order of 2 October 1998) or “endure unusual, undeserved or disproportionate hardship” (judgement of 24 November 1999), if returned to that country. 7.2 The complainant denies that Canada’s international human rights obligations are taken into account in the PRRA decision-making process, as this procedure was designed to refuse refugee status to “practically everybody”, the denial rate totalling between 97 and 98 per cent of all applicants. State party’s further submissions and counsel’s comments 8.1 On 19 February 2004, the State party informed the Committee that the complainant’s PRRA had been concluded and requested it to lift its suspension of the consideration of the case, to adopt a decision on the admissibility and merits of the complaint as expeditiously as possible or, alternatively, to withdraw its request for interim measures, in accordance with rule 108, paragraph 7, of its rules of procedure. 8.2 The State party argues that the evidence produced by the complainant does not support a finding that, as a result of his removal, he would suffer “irreparable damage” within the meaning of rule 108, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure, given his low personal profile, the fact that his alleged torture occurred more than 12 years ago, and that the human rights situation in the 153