CAT/C/59/D/633/2014 substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, as the complainant has sufficiently detailed the facts and the basis of the claim for a decision by the Committee. 6.3 The Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, it shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that, in the present case, the State party has not contested that the complainant has not exhausted all available domestic remedies. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that it is not precluded by article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention from examining the present case. As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 7.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the expulsion of the complainant to Sri Lanka would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 7.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Sri Lanka. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The Committee remains seriously concerned about the continued and consistent allegations of widespread use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment perpetrated by State actors, both the military and the police, which have continued in many parts of the country since the conflict ended in May 2009 (see CAT/C/LKA/CO/3-4, para. 6). However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. 14 7.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable (para. 6), it must be personal and present. In that regard, in previous decisions, the Committee has determined that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real and personal. The Committee recalls that under the terms of general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 7.5 The Committee notes the complainant’s claims that he would be at a real and personal risk of torture if returned to Sri Lanka because: (a) he left Sri Lanka illegally and 14 See communications No. 282/2005, S.P.A. v. Canada, decision adopted on 7 November 2006; No. 333/2007, T.I. v. Canada, decision adopted on 15 November 2010; and No. 344/2008, A.M.A. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 12 November 2010. 11