CAT/C/71/D/883/2018 7.2 In accordance with article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention, the Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that the individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee notes that the complainants’ asylum application was rejected by the Swedish Migration Agency on 4 September 2017, that the Migration Court rejected their appeal against a negative decision on 12 April 2018, and that the Migration Court of Appeal denied the complainants’ request for leave to appeal on 16 May 2018. The Committee also notes that, in the present case, the State party has not contested that the complainants have exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Committee therefore finds that it is not precluded from considering the communication under article 22 (5) (b) of the Convention. 7.3 The Committee notes the State party’s submission that the communication is manifestly ill-founded and thus inadmissible pursuant to article 22 (2) of the Convention. The Committee observes, however, that the complaint raises substantive issues under article 3 of the Convention as to the alleged risks of persecution, torture and ill-treatment by the authorities of Armenia, which have been adequately substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, and that those claims should be examined on the merits. As the Committee finds no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 8.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the forcible removal of the complainants including their children to Armenia would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 8.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainants would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Armenia. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 12 8.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017), according to which the nonrefoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or a member of a group which may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee recalls that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”. 13 8.5 The Committee also recalls that the burden of proof is on the author of the complaint, who must present an arguable case, that is, submit substantiated arguments showing that the risk of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, personal, present and real. The Committee also recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned, however it is not bound by such findings and will make a free assessment 12 13 See, for example, M.S. v. Denmark (CAT/C/55/D/571/2013), para. 7.3. See the Committee’s general comment No. 4 (2017), para. 11. 7