Conduct of others Somewhat more complicated is the question of whether others involved in the international human rights law violation may also be identified, for example the centre commander, his or her superiors or anyone who facilitated the torture, such as guards at the facility.50 Where the human rights violation is also a crime under domestic or, as in the example above, international law, the investigative body would be able to use the applicable criminal provisions – including modes of liability and mens rea, designed to capture other roles, such as those of superiors and accomplices.51 When the international human rights law violation committed by a State (through its agents) is not criminal in nature, the accountability imperative remains. The investigative body may identify those directly or indirectly involved in the violation, including those who failed to act when obliged to do so.52 Beyond criminal justice, some of the means may be provided for instance by administrative measures, political accountability, civil liability or disciplinary measures relating to dereliction of duty. Where an investigative body finds that a State’s legal framework, for example, imposes impermissible restrictions on the human right to freedom of expression, the individuals who establish or implement the policies could be identified, as well as Some international human rights treaties directly provide for the involvement of non-direct perpetrators. For example the CAT obliges States to criminalize both direct and indirect involvement. See CAT art. 4 (1): “The same shall apply to ... an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.” In the case against Hissene Habre under CAT, for example, the former president of Chad was convicted of perpetrating torture directly but also doing so indirectly, under a mode of liability akin to “joint criminal enterprise”: Court of Justice of the Extraordinary African Chambers, Trial Judgment of 30 May 2016, para. 2170. While CAT ensures that a State criminalizes the conduct, including that of other, non-direct perpetrators, it does not provide a basis for identifying a perpetrator coming from the upper echelons of a State hierarchy in the sense of “superior responsibility” (note that Habre was also convicted of the war crime of torture, under a command responsibility rubric – see Judgment, para. 2261). The Convention on Enforced Disappearances does capture the conduct of superiors who “knew or should have known” of their subordinates’ acts (art. 6 (b)). The Genocide Convention captures conspiracy and complicity (art. 3). The Apartheid Convention prohibits participation, conspiracy, abetting, encouragement and “cooperation” (art. 3). 51 Domestic criminal statutes will have the means of capturing the conduct of accomplices, superiors and others involved. For international crimes, the Rome Statute (art. 25) employs modes of liability that include ordering, soliciting, inducing, participating, aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting, planning, conspiring, inciting or failing to act when obliged to do so, in particular when in a position of superior or command responsibility. For human rights imperatives on bringing to justice all those responsible, see, inter alia, Updated Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity (“Impunity Principles”), United Nations doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, recommended by Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/81, 21 April 2005, principle 8 (c). 52 To make findings on those indirectly involved, it might be helpful to consider the modes of liability used in criminal processes. Also, recall that States are obliged to investigate alleged human rights violations and to provide remedies, and that failure to do so is a distinct violation. Individuals who fail in that respect may also be held accountable. 50 COLLECTING AND ANALYSING THE INFORMATION 31