• Their understanding of the parties involved, of their motivation, and of the hierarchies and structures, both civilian and military; • Contact with victims and witnesses who may have information; and • How they know the above information. HRDs can be helpful in broadening the contacts and network base of investigators, but it is also important to assess aspects such as funding, political allegiance or linkage issues when determining the reliability of the individual and the credibility of the information provided. Interviews with journalists (see “Professional media”, below) and others such as academics, experts, members of think tanks, parliamentarians, political commentators, etc. are normally context-specific, and depend largely on the person’s area of expertise, and therefore do not lend themselves to generalized question lists. On the other hand, such interviews are rarely undertaken without time for preparation. Investigators should look into the background of these sources, public statements or articles written by them, and what types of information and fields of knowledge they specialize in that might be of use to the investigation, as well as any connection they may have to any of the parties. A well-informed and well-prepared investigator can secure valuable information from such sources. Annex IV contains a sample set of questions/instructions adapted from a CoI that was mandated to identify responsible individuals. (c) Publicly available information, open sources and social networks Among the sources publicly available, a unique and often overlooked one is documentary information and publications from a State’s (or conflict party’s) armed forces and other government entities. The visible trend of such entities to use social media – at times to promote their own battlefield successes, at other times for fundraising, recruiting or propaganda – can provide a trove of material relevant to investigations. Yearbooks, rosters, promotional materials, websites and even death notices can help locate an individual within a security or military hierarchy. Such sources may also include the official results and publications of government or military investigations, claims of responsibility by specific groups, or indications of actual physical presence through media releases, official photographs, etc. They may show the structures, units and sub-units that can contribute to actor mapping. Equally, private social media accounts may show that particular individuals were in particular locations at a given time or interacted with relevant individuals, or they may provide information on the attitudes of the account holder that may be relevant, COLLECTING AND ANALYSING THE INFORMATION 65