Example 2: Guinea 2009 “Shortly after the events, the President complained about his undisciplined army. However, he also demonstrated considerable control over the military, since the regular army obeyed his orders, transmitted through the chief of staff of the armed forces, to remain in their barracks throughout the day, despite the seriousness of the events taking place in the city. Furthermore, the President’s 2 November 2009 decision to promote all senior non-commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the army – including those who were members of the branches of the army that took part in the 28 September events – to a higher rank with effect from 23 December, would appear to indicate that their acts were perpetrated with the President’s blessing. “227. The Commission has gathered considerable information on the wellorganized and coordinated efforts made to cover up the crimes committed; the security forces that perpetrated the crimes were behind those efforts. The President did nothing to prevent or stop those efforts. “228. The Commission therefore finds that there is sufficient evidence showing that President Moussa Dadis Camara incurred military command responsibility for the crimes described in this report.”89 The extent to which an investigation can uncover linkage evidence will be a combination of, inter alia, resource allocation and context. At a minimum, investigative bodies should record information received together with an assessment of its credibility. When time and resources permit, the investigation should actively pursue such information, analyse gaps, and target future efforts at closing those gaps – storing all such information in a regularly updated actor map. Securing quality linkage information can be difficult and human-resource intensive: the extent to which it is pursued is to be balanced against other investigation priorities. 89 “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry mandated to establish the facts and circumstances of the events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea” (Guinea Report), S/2009/693, para. 226. COLLECTING AND ANALYSING THE INFORMATION 49