The benefits of this approach are that the information collected by the investigative body is actually being used to further justice initiatives. As the information is not released publicly, the core human rights concerns of the person identified are alleviated to a significant degree. Nor is the “right of reply” from principle 9 of the Impunity Principles invoked,134 although nothing prohibits the investigative body from upholding such a right, and certainly where feasible it should do so. This would also be in conformity with the principle of impartiality. Importantly, the Syria CoI reaffirmed that the consent of the persons providing the information should be obtained in advance. Under applicable source protection procedures, staff involved in the investigation, and later OHCHR personnel, must also consider, irrespective of the consent provided, whether sharing could compromise the security of the source.135 Assessing the recipient136 The Syria CoI limited sharing to judicial mechanisms, excluding entities such as truth commissions or other United Nations agencies.137 Each investigative body will make its own decision in this regard but, when assessing the suitability of a recipient, it should consider the following, non-exhaustive criteria: • The purposes for which the information will be used are consistent with those of the United Nations and the mandate of the investigative body; • The recipient has given assurances that confidentiality can and will be maintained; staff reasonably believe that those assurances can and will be respected; • The recipient maintains adequate security protocols for handling sensitive information, including labelling, custody, storage and retrieval; See infra, note 142 (Impunity Principles). OHCHR Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, chapter 14, “Protection of Victims, Witnesses and other Cooperating Persons”, p. 8 (“Do No Harm”), and section 5 B 2, supra. 136 The Syria CoI, like any investigative body contemplating whether to share perpetrator information, had to make an assessment of the ability of the requesting entity – in this case a national court – to handle the confidential information appropriately. The CoI was in a unique position in that its mandate had been repeatedly renewed, giving it time to consider and respond to requests for information. Other investigative bodies may not be in such position. 137 As noted in section 2 B, information on individuals may be useful for, inter alia, truth commissions, assessments under the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, the Policy on Human Rights Screening of United Nations Personnel, and/or national vetting processes. 134 135 HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM THE INFORMATION 81