CCPR/C/122/D/2292/2013 September. The author submitted his PRRA application on 16 September 2013 and CBSA agreed to defer his removal to allow him to await a response to it, despite the fact that under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act such an application does not have a suspensive effect on an exclusion order. 6.9 With regard to procedural fairness in the review of the PRRA application, the State party explains that an oral hearing is informal and non-adversarial. Such a hearing, the purpose of which is to assess the applicant’s credibility, can be held if the PRRA agent finds that the evidence provided suggests that the claimant is not credible, as was the case here. The hearing gives the PRRA applicant the opportunity to answer the questions posed, assisted by legal counsel if necessary. 6.10 The State party maintains that, when assessing the author’s credibility, the PRRA agent took into account his vulnerability as an asylum seeker and his psychological state. Upon conducting the judicial review of the agent’s decision, the Federal Court found that the agent’s assessment of the author’s credibility was reasonable and that the agent had clearly explained why he had not found the applicant to be credible based on the documentary evidence provided. 6.11 Lastly, contrary to the claims of the author, the State party considers that the PRRA agent did not focus solely on the author’s credibility when arriving at his decision. Upon its judicial review of the PRRA decision, the Federal Court found that the decision was entirely reasonable and noted that it had been based on an analysis of all the documentation provided, which supported the agent’s findings. 6.12 The State party therefore submits that the author has not established that the assessment conducted by the Canadian decision-making bodies was manifestly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. It recalls that it is not the Committee’s function to act as a fourth jurisdiction to review the decisions taken by the competent Canadian authorities, 31 particularly in respect of determining the existence of substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm upon expulsion. 32 Neither the author’s communication nor his observations establish that the decisions of the Canadian authorities were in any way flawed. 6.13 The State party also considers that the author’s allegations concerning the homosexual relationships he maintained in Egypt, including with an individual named Hany, are highly doubtful and are not supported by objective evidence. In particular, the author has not submitted any objective evidence of the alleged attack or the death of his partner, nor has he provided his partner’s photograph or death certificate. Neither has the author provided any media reports of the attack, nor had any of his friends or family members met Hany. 6.14 Furthermore, the oral hearing in 2013 revealed contradictions in relation to the head injuries the author claims to have sustained, and the photographic evidence provided does not show where the author was allegedly injured. The medical letter submitted by the author at the time of the second review of his PRRA application 33 — and which he had not submitted in support of his initial communication — documents the injuries that he allegedly sustained and his scars. However, the letter does not explain the doctor’s reasons for stating that the scars on the author’s back, shoulders and head resulted from the 2012 attack and is based entirely on the author’s account. 6.15 The State party also indicates that the alleged attack was not carried out by, or with the complicity of, State authorities. The fact that the author renewed his Egyptian passport two months before the alleged attack undermines any allegations of persecution of him by the Egyptian authorities. As to the author’s claims that his sister is a well-known actor and 31 32 33 10 See Hamida v. Canada (CCPR/C/98/D/1544/2007), paras. 8.4–8.6; Solo Tarlue v. Canada (CCPR/C/95/D/1551/2007), para. 7.4; Kaur v. Canada (CCPR/C/94/D/1455/2006), para. 7.3; and Tadman and Prentice v. Canada (CCPR/C/93/D/1481/2006), para. 7.3. See Choudhary v. Canada (CCPR/C/109/D/1898/2009), para. 9.2; Thuraisamy v. Canada (CCPR/C/106/D/1912/2009), para. 7.4; A.A. v. Canada (CCPR/C/103/D/1819/2008), para. 7.8; and Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), paras. 11.2 and 11.4. See footnote 8 above. GE.18-09612