The complaint 3.1 The author states that he would be at risk of torture upon his return to Ghana and that deportation by the Canadian authorities constitutes a violation of the Convention. 3.2 In Canada, the risk assessment is made by immigration officers who, according to the author, do not have the necessary competence in matters of international human rights law or in other legal matters and do not fulfil the basic criteria of impartiality and independence for taking such decisions. The author also refers to a case of the European Court of Human Rights (Chahal v. The United Kingdom) which indicates the legal guarantees that must be respected by the country that is deporting: "In such cases, given the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of ill-treatment materialized and the importance the Court attaches to article 3, the notion of an effective remedy under article 13 requires independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3. This scrutiny must be carried out without regard to what the person may gave done to warrant expulsion or to any perceived threat to the national security of the expelling State. ... Such scrutiny need not be provided by a judicial authority but, if it is not, the powers and guarantees which it affords are relevant to determining whether the remedy before it is effective." The author affirms that the State party's procedure of risk assessment violate this mandatory "independent scrutiny". The same authorities that study the relevance of the removal from Canadian territory proceed to the deportation itself. State party's observations on admissibility 4.1 In a submission dated 9 November 1998, the State party submitted that the communication was inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies as required by article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention and rule 91 of the Committee's rules of procedure. 4.2 The State party underlines that it is a fundamental principle of international law that domestic remedies must be exhaust before remedy from an international body may be sought. This principle gives the State an opportunity to correct internally any wrong that may have been committed before the State's international responsibility is engaged. 4.3 The State party argues that the author has failed to seek ministerial exemption on humanitarian and compassionate grounds under subsection 114 (2) of the Canadian Immigration Act and section 2.1 of its Immigration Regulations. This remedy would have enabled the author to apply to the Minister on Immigration and Citizenship at any time for an exemption from the requirements of the immigration legislation or for admission to Canada on compassionate or humanitarian grounds. In this regard, the State party refers to the jurisprudence of the Committee in its decision K. v. Canada (communication No. 42/1996, 25 November 1997), where the author had been deemed not to have exhausted domestic remedies since he had not lodged a request for a ministerial waiver for humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 4.4 The State party also refers to the author's claim that the judicial review by the Federal Court of Canada has no suspensive effect and therefore entitles the State party to deport the applicant while the Federal Court is deciding whether such removal is legal. It emphasizes that in these cases there is a possibility to make an application to the Federal Court for an interim order staying removal while the decision is pending before the 176