CAT/C/54/D/491/2012 subjected to torture. The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Ethiopia. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subject to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 13 7.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, according to which the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While the risk does not have to meet the test of being “highly probable”, 14 the Committee recalls that the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case that he or she faces a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk.15 The Committee further recalls that, in accordance with its general comment No. 1, it gives considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by the organs of the State party concerned, while at the same time it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22 (4) of the Convention, to carry out a free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case.16 7.4 In the present case, the complainant claims that she was a sympathizer of OLF; that she participated in Mecha Tulema activities in Ethiopia; that, in May 2004, she was detained in a police station for 25 hours, beaten and kicked by police officers; and that later she met the police officer who had arrested her, who told her that he knew that she was a member of OLF. The Committee also notes the State party’s observations concerning the complainant’s lack of credibility, in particular that she provided contradicting statements regarding her relationship and affiliation with OLF and Mecha Tulema; that she lived in Ethiopia for more than two years after her alleged detention in May 2004 without any problems with the authorities; that she left her country legally with a passport; and that, during the interview under the first asylum proceedings, she stated that she had left her country to escape from poverty. 7.5 The Committee notes that the complainant has not submitted any objective evidence whatsoever to substantiate her account of her alleged experiences in Ethiopia prior to her departure. In her comments to the State party’s observations, she argues that the State party failed to carry out an independent medical assessment of her allegations of torture although, during the interview on 30 August 2007, she had mentioned to the authorities that she had a 13 14 15 16 See communications No. 426/2010, R. D. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 8 November 2013, para. 9.2; No. 344/2008, A. M. A. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 12 November 2010, para. 7.2; and No. 333/2007, decision adopted on 15 November 2010, para. 7.3. See the Committee’s general comment No. 1 (1997) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, para. 6. Ibid.; see also, communication No. 203/2002, A. R. v. the Netherlands, decision adopted on 21 November 2003, para. 7.3. See, inter alia, communication No. 466/2011, Alp v. Denmark, decision adopted on 14 May 2014, para. 8.3. 9