CEDAW/C/73/D/100/2016 violence cases. The fact that domestic violence cases are handled t hrough private prosecution amounts to discrimination and a violation by the authorities of their positive obligations under article 2 (b), (c) and (f) of the Convention, read in conjunction with articles 1 and 3 of the Convention and taking into considerat ion the Committee’s general recommendations No. 19, No. 28 and No. 33. According to the authors, perpetrators of domestic violence should be prosecuted by the State in order to avoid the imposition of further burdens or additional risks on the victims. 3.5 Regarding the initiation of a criminal case under article 20 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the authors claim that, in practice, no such cases are opened by the police because: (a) only the psychological and physical health of the victim (the presence of a disability or serious illness) and her age are considered, while other important factors are disregarded; and (b) initiating the public prosecution of a criminal case is construed as a right but not an obligation of the police. With reference to the Committee’s general recommendation No. 33, the authors emphasize that the State party must ensure that its judicial system is of good quality. Evidentiary requirements must not be overly restrictive, inflexible or influenced by gender stereotyping. According to the authors, the narrow interpretation of the procedural law and the refusal to take into account the authors’ specific circumstances, the nature of the violence suffered or the degree of risk that the violence would recur amount to discrimination, in violation of article 2 (b), (c) and (f), read in conjunction with articles 1 and 3, of the Convention. 3.6 The authors claim that, in handling their cases, the authorities were guided by the widespread misconception that domestic violence is not a ser ious crime and does not constitute a threat to the victim’s life, safety or integrity, but is a “private matter”, and that there is no public interest in prosecuting perpetrators of such crimes. Police and judges relied on the belief that women who are victims of domestic violence can easily defend their rights. For those reasons, the authorities did not show due diligence when dealing with the cases, and criminal cases were not opened even when the authors demonstrated the systemic nature of the violence t hat they suffered. The courts upheld the decisions not to initiate criminal proceedings. 3.7 A police officer openly voiced a stereotypical opinion in court on 16 March 2015, to the effect that the officer was aware that Y. ’s husband was a high earning businessman who was buying apartments and cars while the author sat at home. On 20 May 2015, the officer stated in court that it was unclear why the author did not go to stay with her parents. With reference to the Committee’s case law, the authors recall that gender stereotypes have a negative impact on the right of women to a fair trial and access to justice. 1 By relying upon stereotypical views and attitudes in their approach in the authors’ cases, the authorities breached their obligations under article 5 (a) of the Convention, taking into consideration the Committee ’s general recommendations No. 19, No. 28 and No. 33. 3.8 The authors claim that the State party has failed to provide special training to its law enforcement officials, including the police, prosecutors and the judiciary, on addressing domestic and gender-based violence and has failed to provide statistics on the prevalence of such violence. As a result, when the authors contacted the authorities under threat, the latter failed to take appropr iate action. The lack of adequate training and statistics amounts to a violation of the State party ’s obligations to promote and fulfil women’s rights. 3.9 The authors also claim that neither the State party’s law nor practice provide for rehabilitation programmes for perpetrators of domestic violence. No rehabilitation __________________ 1 8/18 The authors refer to the Committee’s views in Vertido v. Philippines (CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008) and V.K. v. Bulgaria (CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008). 19-15442