EL HASKI v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT 29 violation of another Convention right is concerned, the nature of the violation found (see, inter alia, Khan v. the United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, § 34, ECHR 2000-V; P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, § 76, ECHR 2001-IX; Allan v. the United Kingdom, no. 48539/99, § 42, ECHR 2002-IX; and Gäfgen, cited above, § 163). 83. In determining whether the proceedings as a whole were fair, regard must also be had as to whether the rights of the defence have been respected. In particular, it must be examined whether the applicant was given an opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and to oppose its use. In addition, the quality of the evidence must be taken into consideration, as must the circumstances in which it was obtained and whether these circumstances cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy. While no problem of fairness necessarily arises where the evidence obtained was unsupported by other material, it may be noted that where the evidence is very strong and there is no risk of its being unreliable, the need for supporting evidence is correspondingly weaker (see, inter alia, Khan, cited above, §§ 35 and 37; Allan, cited above, § 43; Jalloh, cited above, § 96; and Gäfgen, cited above, § 164). In this connection, the Court further attaches weight to whether the evidence in question was or was not decisive for the outcome of the criminal proceedings (see Gäfgen, cited above, § 164). 84. As to the examination of the nature of the Convention violation found, the Court reiterates that the question whether the use as evidence of information obtained in violation of Article 8 rendered a trial as a whole unfair contrary to Article 6 has to be determined with regard to all the circumstances of the case, and in particular to the question of respect for the applicant’s defence rights and the quality and importance of the evidence in question (ibid.). 85. However, particular considerations apply in respect of the use in criminal proceedings of evidence obtained in breach of Article 3. The use of such evidence, secured as a result of a violation of one of the core and absolute rights guaranteed by the Convention, always raises serious issues as to the fairness of the proceedings, even if the admission of such evidence was not decisive in securing a conviction (see İçöz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 54919/00, 9 January 2003; Jalloh, cited above, §§ 99 and 104; Göçmen v. Turkey, no. 72000/01, §§ 73-74, 17 October 2006; Harutyunyan, cited above, § 63; and Gäfgen, cited above, § 165). Therefore, the use in criminal proceedings of statements obtained as a result of a violation of Article 3 – irrespective of the classification of the treatment as torture, inhuman or degrading treatment – renders the proceedings as a whole automatically unfair, in breach of Article 6 (see Gäfgen, cited above, §§ 166-167 and 173). This also holds true for the use of real evidence obtained as a direct result of acts of torture (ibid., § 173); the admission of such evidence obtained as a result of an act qualified as inhuman treatment in breach of Article 3, but falling short of torture, will