Watch agrees with this interpretation of the burden of proof, particularly in light of the practical difficulties of establishing the use of torture or prohibited ill-treatment on individuals whose statements or testimony are cited but who are not defendants themselves. Oversight and Accountability The Bundestag Parliamentary Control Commission (Parlamentärisches Kontrollgremium) has a relatively robust mandate to oversee the activities of the BfV, the BND, as well as the Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst). The committee is empowered to access documentation and files, question staff of the three services, and launch ad hoc investigations into specific cases. Despite its strong mandate, it is notable that the most far-reaching inquiry into German complicity in counterterrorism abuses was undertaken by a special parliamentary inquiry. A three-year special parliamentary inquiry into, among other issues, alleged German complicity in the renditions and mistreatment of German citizens Khaled el-Masri and Mohammed Zammar and German resident Murat Kurnaz, concluded in June 2009 there was no evidence to substantiate allegations of complicity or negligence by German authorities or intelligence services. Political parties in the opposition alleged that the government and intelligence services failed to cooperate with the inquiry and withheld relevant documents. In July 2009, the Constitutional Court ruled that the government had breached the constitution in restricting the evidence it provided without giving sufficient justifications.120 Reforms in 2009 strengthened the Kontrollgremium by explicitly defining the committee’s powers to request any document in its original version, invite members of the intelligence agencies to testify at hearings, and to receive an immediate response from the government to its requests.121 The government can, however, refuse to provide information in order to protect sources or the privacy rights of third persons, or when the information touches on decision-making processes within the federal government. This broadly crafted power gives the government considerable discretion to withhold information. https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1162763&Site=CommDH&BackColorInternet=FEC65B&BackColorIntranet=FEC65&BackC olorLogged=FFC679 (accessed September 18, 2009), para. 174. 120 The Constitutional Court affirmed this principle in a separate ruling in the same month. Matt Glenn, “Germany high court rules intelligence may not be withheld from parliament,” Jurist, July 31, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/07/germany-high-court-rules-intelligence.php (accessed September 11, 2009). 121 Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes, passed by Bundestag on May 29, 2009 and Bundesrat on July 10, 2009; and Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der parlamentarischen Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste des Bundes, passed by Bundestag on May 29, 2009 and Bundesrat on July 10, 2009. 43 Human Rights Watch | June 2010