beating, freezing temperatures, and bending people into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed body parts.160 Judicial cooperation, while an important tool in efforts to prosecute terrorism offenses, cannot turn a blind eye to torture and ill-treatment without running afoul of France’s international obligations under the global ban on torture. Investigating judges must make every effort to ensure that this kind of cooperation does not encourage or benefit from such abuse. Oversight and Accountability Until just three years ago France lacked any kind of parliamentary oversight of intelligence services. An October 2007 law created a special parliamentary “delegation” composed of four representatives from each chamber of parliament. The delegation has a weak mandate: it can evaluate the general activities, budget and the organization of French intelligence services, but it does not have powers to examine operational activities, executive instructions to the services, or cooperation with foreign intelligence services or international organizations. The delegation may not have access to any information which the authorities believe could endanger the anonymity, safety or life of a person, whether connected to one of the intelligence services or not, or the methods used to acquire information. Finally, the delegation can only summon the heads of the service, not staff.161 The delegation, which officially began its work in December 2007, produced its first report in December 2009, despite its obligation to publish a report on its activities every year.162 According to the report, the delegation held monthly internal meetings, and eleven meetings with senior intelligence officials, including directors of intelligence services and President Sarkozy’s national intelligence coordinator, Bernard Bajolet. The report does not contain information on the dates, locations and content of these meetings, and provides little detail about the issues addressed by the delegation or its conclusions. The delegation’s weak mandate and the lack of transparency to date with respect to its endeavors raise serious doubts about the role it can play in providing proper democratic oversight. 160 US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2008: Syria,” February 29, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119127.htm (accessed September 21, 2009). See also Human Rights Watch, World Report 2008, chapter on Syria, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k8/docs/2008/01/31/syria17619.htm. 161 Law 2007-1443 of 9 October 2007 creating a parliamentary delegation on intelligence, article 1. 162 The report is available at www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-off/i2170.asp. For a brief explanation of the delegation’s mandate, see www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/delegation_renseignement.asp. 55 Human Rights Watch | June 2010