with the Covenant, but to an argument that the author had been the victim of a violation by the State party of his right to freedom of expression under article 19 of the Covenant. This argument had been sufficiently substantiated to require an answer by the State party on the merits. the State party are irrelevant to the instant case; what he raises before the Committee does not concern the occasions on which he was punished for having organized demonstrations. This does not mean, counsel adds, that his client's conviction under the Law on Demonstrations and Assembly were reasonable and proper: it is said to be common that leaders of opposition groups in the Republic of Korea are convicted for each and every demonstration staged anywhere in the country, under an "implied conspiracy theory". 6.4 The Committee was satisfied, on the basis of the material before it, that the author had exhausted all available domestic remedies within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol; it noted in this context that the State party had not objected to the admissibility of the case on this ground. 5.3 The author reiterates that he has not raised the issue of the National Security Law's compatibility with the Covenant. He does indeed express his view that, as the Committee acknowledged in its Concluding Observations on the State party's initial report, the said law remains a serious obstacle to the full realization of Covenant rights. However, he stresses that his communication concerns "solely the fact that he was punished for his peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression, in violation of article 19, paragraph 2, of the Covenant". 7. On 14 March 1996, the Human Rights Committee therefore decided that the communication was admissible inasmuch as it appeared to raise issues under article 19 of the Covenant. State party's merits submission and counsel's comments 8.1 In its submission, dated 21 February 1997, the State party explains that its Constitution guarantees its citizens fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and the press and freedom of assembly and association. These freedoms and rights may be restricted by law only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare. The Constitution stipulates further that even when such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be violated. The Committee's admissibility decision 6.1 At its 56th session, the Committee considered the admissibility of the communication. 6.2 The Committee took note of the State party's argument that as the present case was based on events which occurred prior to the entry into force of the Covenant and the Optional Protocol for the Republic of Korea, it should be deemed inadmissible ratione temporis. In the instant case the Committee did not have to refer to its jurisprudence under which the effects of a violation that continued after the Covenant entered into force for the State party might themselves constitute a violation of the Covenant, since the violation alleged by the author was his conviction under the National Security Law. As this conviction took place after the entry into force of the Covenant on 10 July 1990 (24 August 1990 for conviction; 11 January 1991 for the appeal, and 26 April 1991 for the Supreme Court's judgement), the Committee was not precluded ratione temporis from considering the author's communication. 8.2 The State party submits that it maintains the National Security Law as a minimal legal means of safeguarding its democratic system which is under a constant security threat from North Korea. The law contains some provisions which partially restrict freedoms or rights for the protection of national security, in accordance with the Constitution Article 1 of the National Security Law reads: "The purpose of this law is to control anti-State activities which endanger the national security, so that the safety of the State as well as the existence and freedom of the citizens may be secured." Article 7, paragraph 1, reads "Any person who has praised or has encouraged or sided with the activities of an antiState organization or its members or a person who has been under instruction form such an organization, or who has benefited an anti-State organization by other means shall be punished by penal servitude for a term not exceeding seven years." Paragraph 5 of article 7 reads: "Any person who has, for the purpose of committing the actions as stipulated in the above paragraphs, produced, imported, duplicated, kept in custody, transported, disseminated, sold or acquired documents, drawings 6.3 The State party had argued that the author's rights were fully protected during the judicial procedures against him, and that he was challenging in general terms the compatibility of the National Security Law with the Covenant. The Committee did not share this assessment. The author claimed that he had been convicted under article 7, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the National Security Law, for mere acts of expression. He further claimed that no proof was presented either of specific intention to endanger state security, or of any actual harm caused thereto. These claims did not amount to an abstract challenge of the compatibility of the National Security Law 113