State party, there is no evidence that at any time A. failed to obtain legal advice or representation when he sought it. On balance, the conditions under which the author was detained did not obstruct his access to legal advice (see below, paragraphs 7.8 to 7.11). The State party maintains that contrary to counsel's assertion, long delays did not result from any change in legal advisors after A.'s consecutive moves between detention centres. particular, the State party disagrees with the suggestion that rules or standards which are said to exist under customary international law or under other international agreements may be imported into the Covenant. The State party concludes that detention for purposes of exclusion from the country, for the investigation of protection claims, and for handling refugee or entry permit applications and protecting public security, is entirely compatible with article 9, paragraph 1. 7.5 As to the claim under article 9, paragraph 1, the State party argues that the author's detention was lawful and not arbitrary on any ground. A. entered Australia without authorization, and subsequently applied for the right to remain on refugee status basis. Initially, he was held pending examination of his application. His subsequent detention was related to his appeals against the decisions refusing his application, which made him liable to deportation. Detention was considered necessary primarily to prevent him from absconding into the Australian community. 7.8 As to the claim under article 9, paragraph 4, the State party reaffirms that it was always open to the author to file an action challenging the lawfulness of his detention, e.g. by seeking a ruling from the courts as to whether his detention was compatible with Australian law. The courts had the power to release A, if they determined that he was being unlawfully detained. In that respect, the State party takes issue with the Committee's admissibility considerations relating to article 9, paragraph 4. For the State party, this provision does not require that State party courts must always be free to substitute their discretion for the discretion of Parliament, in as much as detention is concerned: "[T]he Covenant does not require that a court must be able to order the release of a detainee, even if the detention was according to law". 7.6 The State party notes that the travaux préparatoires to article 9, paragraph 1, show that the drafters of the Covenant considered that the notion of "arbitrariness" included "incompatibility with the principles of justice or with the dignity of the human person". Furthermore, it refers to the Committee's jurisprudence according to which the notion of arbitrariness must not be equated with "against the law", but must be interpreted more broadly as encompassing elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability4. Against this background, the State party contends, detention in a case such as the author's was not disproportionate nor unjust; it was also predictable, in that the applicable Australian law had been widely publicized. To the State party, counsel's argument that it is inappropriate per se to detain individuals entering Australia in an unauthorized manner is not borne out by any of the provisions of the Covenant. 7.9 Furthermore, the State party specifically rejects the notion that article 9, paragraph 4, implicitly includes the same (procedural) guarantees for provision of legal assistance as are set out in article 14, paragraph 3: in its opinion, a distinction must be drawn between the provision of free legal assistance in terms of article 14, paragraph 3, and allowing access to legal assistance. In any event, it continues, there is no substance to the author's allegation that his rights under article 9, paragraph 4, were impeded by an alleged absence of effective access to legal advice. The author "had ample access to legal advice and representation for the purpose of challenging the lawfulness of his detention", and was legally represented when he brought such a challenge. 7.7 The State party asserts that the argument that there is a rule of public international law, be it derived from custom or conventional law, against the detention of asylum seekers, is not only erroneous and unsupported by prevailing State practice, but also irrelevant to the considerations of the Human Rights Committee. The instruments and practice invoked by counsel -inter alia the 1951 Refugee Convention, Conclusion 44 of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the practice of 12 Western states - are said to fall far short from proving the existence of a rule of customary international law. In 7.10 In support of its argument, the State party provides a detailed chronology of attempts to inform A. of his right to legal advice: (a) The form used for applications for refugee status advises applicants of their right to have a legal advisor present during interview and to ask for legal aid assistance. The application form was read to the author on 9 December 1989 at Willie's Creek in the Kampuchean language by an interpreter, completed and signed by the author. The author did not request legal advice or access to a lawyer at this time; 4 See Views on communication No. 305/1988 (Hugo van Alphen v. The Netherlands), adopted on 23 July 1990, paragraph 5.8. (b) During his first six months of detention, the author had contact with members of 97