CCPR/C/116/D/2193/2012 5.2 The counsel further notes the State party’s argument that the author complained about ill-treatment only eight months after his arrest and five months following the adoption of the decision authorizing his extradition, thus unjustifiably prolonging the adoption of the decision on extradition. In that regard, the counsel submits that she only started representing the author before the Moscow Regional Court at the appeals stage and that, as soon as she found out about the author’s ill-treatment during his apprehension and the necessary evidence was obtained, she submitted the relevant information to the authorities. In addition, it is for the State party’s authorities to investigate ill-treatment claims. Upon detention, the author was examined by the detention facility’s medical personnel, who established that he had bodily injuries and noted them in his medical records. The State party’s authorities did not, however, investigate the cause of those injuries. The author eventually complained about his ill-treatment but the authorities decided not to initiate criminal proceedings. The counsel notes that this decision was later quashed and that no final decision has been taken in that regard. 5.3 The counsel further refers to the State party’s argumentation on the assurances provided by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Kyrgyzstan that the author would not be subjected to ill-treatment upon return and that nothing demonstrates that Kyrgyzstan would breach the provided assurances. She notes that during his extradition and asylum proceedings the author provided sufficient evidence to substantiate his fears of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment upon return. The counsel notes that the examination of the author’s asylum claim was formalistic and that during his extradition proceedings the claimed risk of ill-treatment was not assessed. She refers to the judgment in the case Yakubov v. Russia, wherein the European Court of Human Rights stated that requiring an applicant to submit “indisputable evidence” of the risk of ill-treatment, places on him or her a disproportionate burden of proving the existence of a future event and therefore, in practice, deprives him or her of an opportunity to obtain a meaningful examination of his or her claim.1 She notes that the sole argument made by State party to justify its conclusion that the author’s rights would not be breached upon return is the fact that Kyrgyzstan is also a party to the Covenant and that, therefore, it is independently responsible for observing the Covenant’s requirements with respect to the Russian Federation and to the international community. According to the counsel, this demonstrates that the State party is trying to place the responsibility on Kyrgyzstan in case the author will be subjected to ill-treatment upon return. 5.4 The counsel further refers to the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment concerning the use of torture and lack of accountability in Kyrgyzstan.2 She also refers to the judgment in the case Saliyev v. Russia, wherein the European Court of Human Rights stated: even accepting for the sake of argument that the assurances in question were not couched in general terms, the Court observes that Kyrgyzstan is not a Contracting State to the Convention, nor have its authorities demonstrated the existence of an effective system of legal protection against torture that could act as an equivalent to the system required of the Contracting States. Moreover, it has not been demonstrated before the Court that Kyrgyzstan’s commitment to guaranteeing access to the applicant by Russian diplomatic staff would lead to effective protection against proscribed ill-treatment in practical terms, as it has not been shown that the aforementioned staff would be in possession of the expertise required for effective follow-up of the Kyrgyz authorities’ compliance with their undertakings. Nor was 1 2 6 Yakubov v. Russia (application No. 7265/10), European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 8 November 2011, para. 99. A/HRC/19/61/Add.2.