CCPR/C/130/D/2946/2017 “strong”, he nevertheless practises Islam and has never converted to Christianity. The Committee also notes that the author, while claiming the existence of a risk of being perceived as a Christian convert in Afghanistan, has not commented on the State party’s reference to country information indicating that Afghans have great understanding for compatriots who try everything to obtain residence in Europe. 7.7 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004), in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists.9 In making such assessment, all relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.10 The Committee recalls its jurisprudence according to which considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party and reiterates that it is generally for the organs of the States parties to the Covenant to review and evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. 11 7.8 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee observes that the author has failed to identify any such irregularity in the decision-making process of the Danish immigration authorities in the framework of his asylum proceedings and has failed to sufficiently substantiate why the decisions of these authorities were clearly arbitrary, manifestly erroneous or amounted to a denial of justice. Regarding the author’s reference to the Committee’s views in A.A.S. v. Denmark, the Committee notes that, in spite of some apparent similarities, that case fundamentally differs from the case at hand given the specific context in Somalia at that time and the distinct individual circumstances of its author, which, taken together, rendered him particularly vulnerable, and therefore considers it irrelevant in the present circumstances. 7.9 Without prejudice to the continuing responsibility of the State party to take into account the situation in the country to which the author would be deported and not underestimating the concerns that may legitimately be expressed with respect to the general human rights situation in Afghanistan, the Committee considers that, in the light of all the available information regarding the author’s personal circumstances, his claims under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant are insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and are therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 8. The Committee therefore decides: (a) Protocol; That the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional (b) That the present decision shall be transmitted to the State party and to the author. 9 10 11 See, for example, X v. Denmark, para. 9.2; V.R. and N.R. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/117/D/2745/2016), para. 4.4; J.I. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/128/D/3032/2017), para. 7.3; and A.E. v. Sweden (CCPR/C/128/D/3300/2019), para. 9.3. Ibid. V.R. and N.R. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/117/D/2745/2016), para. 4.4; F.B.L. v. Costa Rica (CCPR/C/109/D/1612/2007), para. 4.2; Fernández Murcia v. Spain (CCPR/C/92/D/1528/2006), para. 4.3; and Schedko v. Belarus (CCPR/C/77/D/886/1999), para. 9.3. 7