E/CN.4/1998/38 page 28 on active duty. Such recruitment was done after consultations with the local authorities and based on three criteria: the civilians had to be unemployed; physically fit to work as porters; and a reasonable amount of wages had to be fixed and agreed upon before recruiting. Civilian labourers thus recruited were never required to accompany the troops to the actual scene of battle, neither were they exposed to danger. The respective military unit had the responsibility of paying wages and transport charges and providing accommodation, food and medical coverage for the hired labourers. There also existed volunteer porters and professional porters who earned their living by offering their services as porters. The porters were treated well by the armed forces. 139. The Government further responded to general allegations transmitted in 1996, concerning abuses said to have been carried out by the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA), which was reported to receive logistical, tactical and other support from the tatmadaw (E/CN.4/1997/7, para. 146). The Government stated that the DKBA was the fighting unit of the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Organization (DKBO), which broke away from the armed terrorist group Kayin National Union (KNU) in 1994, due to dissatisfaction with the leadership. When the KNU launched a massive offensive against the DKBO in January 1995, during which hundreds of people, including civilians, were killed, the local inhabitants had requested assistance from the tatmadaw. The Government stated that, since the aspirations of the DKBO had revealed the sincerity of their wishes for peace and stability of the region and coincided with those of the Government, the tatmadaw had provided the necessary logistical support. While the DKBA launched its assault on the KNU headquarters, tatmadaw units secured the rear with the aim of protecting nearby villages from attack by KNU remnants. Armed clashes had broken out at times between the forces of the KNU and the DKBO. As the Government had not yet held any official peace talks with the DKBO, and as the DKBO had yet to return to the legal fold, the Myanmar authorities had no control over the DKBO. Neither could the authorities be held responsible for the activities of the DKBO. 140. The Special Rapporteur also transmitted to the Government six newly reported cases, two of them collective, on behalf of eight individuals and retransmitted a number of cases, submitted in 1995 and 1996, to which no reply had been received. In addition, he made two urgent appeals in conjunction with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on behalf of 15 individuals and some unnamed relatives of two of them. The Government replied to one newly reported individual case and 12 previously transmitted allegations concerning 39 individuals. Observations 141. The Special Rapporteur appreciates the responses of the Government. Nevertheless, he notes the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar that “the practice of torture, portering and forced labour continue to occur in Myanmar, particularly in the context of development programmes and counter-insurgency operations in minority-dominated regions”. (A/52/484, para. 147)