CCPR/C/126/D/2570/2015 2.10 On 11 August 2014, without knowing about the existence of the extradition decree, the author submitted a request for interim measures to the European Court of Human Rights. On 17 September 2014, the Court decided not to issue interim measures, but the author wished to maintain his application. On 20 November 2014, he was informed that on 30 October 2014 and 13 November 2014, the Court, sitting in a single judge formation, had decided to declare his application inadmissible.4 The complaint 3.1 In his initial submission, the author invokes substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited to Ukraine, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to multiple gross violations of the rights and freedoms protected by the Covenant. The author does not claim that extradition as such violates the Covenant, but rather that the particular circumstances related to the effects of his extradition would raise issues under specific provisions of the Covenant, because if a State party extradites a person within its jurisdiction in circumstances such that, as a result, there is a real risk that his or her rights under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant.5 3.2 Reports and judgments of international and domestic courts demonstrate, beyond any reasonable doubt, that there are substantial grounds for believing that if he was extradited, the author would face a real risk of suffering serious violations of his rights under the Covenant, causing irreparable damage. In particular, the author fears that upon return to Ukraine, he would (a) be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, in breach of articles 7 and 10 (1) and (2) (a); (b) suffer torture during pretrial detention, in violation of article 7; and (c) be indefinitely held in provisional detention and deprived of the right to periodically review its lawfulness, in breach of article 9 (1), (3) and (4). 3.3 Invoking article 7 of the Covenant, the author claims that Italy had an obligation to conduct a thorough assessment of the information that was known – or ought to have been known – to the Italian authorities at the time of the decision on extradition and which is relevant for the determination of the risks associated with the extradition. Such an assessment must not be a pure formality, but must be effective.6 The Italian authorities also did not seek any kind of assurance from Ukraine as to what his treatment would be in prison upon his return. 7 Instead, they authorized extradition to a country known to the Committee for “the continued occurrence of torture and ill-treatment by law enforcement authorities”.8 3.4 If extradited, the author would be provisionally held in SIZO No. 30, which is one of the 49 Ukrainian prisons where persons awaiting trial are detained. According to the report to the Government of Ukraine issued in 2013 by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the level of overcrowding in SIZO facilities is particularly high and the current standard of living space per remand prisoner is “far from acceptable”; and these facilities are located in “very old buildings” that are “structurally unsuited to perform their function in accordance with modern accommodation standards and, moreover, were frequently in a severely dilapidated condition”. 9 In a report in 2013, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights also denounced “certain typical violations of human rights that may amount to ill-treatment” such as prisoners held for several hours in cubicles that were not fit to hold people (owing to a lack of windows, ventilation and toilets); cells with insufficient natural and electric lighting; cells and other holding areas not equipped with forced ventilation; prisoners with tuberculosis held together with healthy 4 5 6 7 8 9 4 The English translation of the letter mentions that in the light of the material in its possession and insofar as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court found that the admissibility criteria set out in articles 34 and 35 of the Convention had not been met. See Kindler v. Canada (CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991), paras. 6.1 and 13.1. See Valetov v. Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/110/D/2104/2011), paras. 14.3 and 14.6. See Maksudov and others v. Kyrgyzstan (CCPR/C/93/D/1461, 1462, 1476 & 1477/2006), para. 12.6. CCPR/C/UKR/CO/7, para. 15. See Council of Europe, Report to the Ukrainian Government on the Visit to Ukraine Carried Out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 9 to 21 October 2013 (CPT/Inf (2014) 15), paras. 100–101.