GÄFGEN v. GERMANY JUDGMENT 23 (β) The Redress Trust 86. Referring, in particular, to the Convention institutions’ findings in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (“the Greek case”) (nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, Commission’s report of 5 November 1969, Yearbook 12, p. 461) and in Akkoç v. Turkey (nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93, §§ 25 and 116-17, ECHR 2000-X), the Redress Trust stressed that for a particular act to constitute torture it was not necessary for physical injury to be caused. Mental harm in and of itself was a prevalent form of torture. Moreover, the Court had confirmed that a mere threat of conduct prohibited by Article 3 could itself give rise to a violation of that Article (the third party cited Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom, 25 February 1982, § 26, Series A no. 48). Various international bodies, including, inter alia, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (see paragraph 66 above), the United Nations Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human Rights (see paragraph 67 above) and the United Nations Human Rights Committee (see paragraph 68 above), had likewise found that a threat of serious physical injury could, depending on the circumstances and the impact on the particular individual, constitute torture or another form of ill-treatment. In any event, making a distinction between torture and other ill-treatment was unnecessary in relation to Article 3 of the Convention since, unlike the United Nations Convention against Torture in Articles 1, 15 and 16 (see paragraph 64 above), the relevant Convention Article did not attach any different legal consequences to torture compared to other forms of prohibited ill-treatment. Referring, inter alia, to the case of Labita v. Italy ([GC], no. 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV), the Redress Trust underlined that the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment was absolute and afforded no exceptions, justifications or limitations, irrespective of the circumstances of the case or the conduct of the victim. (c) The Court’s assessment (i) Recapitulation of the relevant principles 87. The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 95, ECHR 1999-V, and Labita, cited above, § 119). The Court has confirmed that even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person