9.11.2017 A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 (11 August 2004) 526. That does not dispose of all the complaints raised by the appellants. Three further complaints are raised about the conduct of the hearing of the instant appeals before SIAC. The first concerns disclosure. The second concerns the weakness of the Secretary of State's evidence in some of the appeals. The third concerns a late amendment which the Secretary of State was permitted to make. 527. Before considering these complaints in turn, it is fair to say, at least on the face of it, that they would not appear to be very strong. First, each of them concerns the sort of matter which is ultimately a case management decision, with which an appellate court is normally very reluctant to interfere. Secondly, as I have already mentioned, it is clear from its judgments in each of the ten appeals that SIAC has very carefully considered each of the arguments and points raised by the parties. Thirdly, the right of appeal to this court from SIAC can only be exercised in relation to a point of law. While the combined effect of these three factors obviously gives rise to problems for an appeal based on the sort of complaints which I am now considering, it would be wrong to dismiss such complaints out of hand. If SIAC went wrong in relation to any of the matters complained of, it might be possible to characterise the mistake as one of law. Furthermore, given the grave potential consequences (prison without a criminal trial) for an appellant if SIAC made an error which rebounded to their disadvantage, it seems to me that this court should not be over-eager to dismiss an appeal on the grounds that it does not raise a point of law, if it has concluded that SIAC may well have gone wrong in a certain respect. 528. Before turning to the three specific complaints, there is one other more general point I should make. It is idle to pretend that there is nothing whatever in any of the three complaints to which I have referred. The procedure before SIAC was less than perfect. However, even bearing in mind the potentially very grave consequences for an appellant if his s25 appeal to SIAC is dismissed, it cannot possibly justify this court ordering a rehearing because the hearing before SIAC could have been better in certain respects. First, almost by definition, no hearing before any tribunal is perfect, in the sense that, with wisdom of hindsight, one can think of steps that might have been taken, or which might have been taken better, more fairly, or earlier, than they actually were. Perfection is unattainable at a hearing, and if its absence justified this court ordering a rehearing, there would never be an end to it. 529. In order to justify this court remitting an appeal to SIAC for rehearing, we would have to be satisfied that there was not merely an imperfection, but an imperfection which amounted to an error of law, or which involved some degree of potential unfairness on the appellant. Many complaints about the conduct of a trial involve criticising the tribunal for a decision which was ultimately one for its discretion. In such a case, it is normally fatal to an appeal if the discretion was exercised in a lawful way, which is not necessarily the same as the way in which the appellate court would have exercised the discretion if it had been the court trying the matter. 530. Furthermore, it is worth remembering that, as the generic judgment in this case shows, SIAC was doing its conscientious best an early stage of its existence, in carrying out an exercise in sensitive circumstances, bearing in mind the competing interests to which I have to more than once referred. There is no doubt that the Secretary of State and his advisors, the barristers and solicitors involved in these proceedings, and the members of SIAC themselves, will have learnt lessons in relation to procedure and disclosure as a result of these very proceedings. However, if a mistake was made in relation to the proceedings, or to disclosure, and that mistake caused material potential unfairness to an appellant, I do not intend thereby to suggest that his appeal should not be remitted to SIAC simply because everyone was at a relatively earlier stage of the learning process. However, I think it is fair to bear that factor in mind when evaluating any criticism of the procedure adopted, or the disclosure process, in these appeals. 531. The appellants' complaint about disclosure is that the Secretary of State has not demonstrated that he has given full disclosure of documents in relation to each of the appeals. In this connection, we were told by leading counsel on behalf of the Secretary of State that the disclosure exercise was initially carried out by lawyers working in, or effectively at the direction of, the Treasury Solicitor's department, but that leading and junior counsel instructed on behalf of the Secretary of State were also involved in the process, albeit relatively late on. 532. I am unpersuaded that there is anything in this complaint. In any proceedings, the disclosure exercise must involve the parties either trusting each other to carry out the initial sifting process, often with the http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1123.html 111/113