9.11.2017 A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 (11 August 2004) court in A, X, Y provide the matrix in which, or the vice against which, ATCSA Part IV was enacted. On ordinary principles the Act is to be interpreted against that background. Accordingly the familiar principle established by their Lordships' House in Padfield is invoked: the discretionary powers conferred by the Act (to certify and detain) may only be exercised in furtherance of the Act's policy and objects. The Act's policy or object, against the background to which I have referred, is and is only to combat the threat posed to the United Kingdom by Al Qa'eda and its associated networks. Once it is recognised that this is nothing more nor less than an application of the Padfield principle, the territory is rock, not sand: law, not concession. I apprehend that this approach is consistent with what was said by Lord Woolf CJ in M v Secretary of State, although Padfield is not there referred to (paragraph 11): "Although the definition of a terrorist in s.21 of the 2001 Act is in general terms it is common ground that the Secretary of State's powers under the 2001 Act are limited by the terms of [the Derogation Order]… Accordingly, those powers cannot be exercised (except in accordance with the derogation) in respect of someone whom he does not reasonably suspect or believe to be a risk to national security because of his connection to the public emergency threatening the life of the nation – namely the threat posed by Al-Qaida and its associated networks. Thus it is not enough that the person detained may have had connections with a terrorist organisation. It must be a terrorist organisation which has links with Al-Qaida." 217. The question, then, is whether SIAC ought to have held that any of these appellants had been certified and detained otherwise than in pursuance of the Act's policy and objects, namely to combat the threat posed to the United Kingdom by Al Qa'eda and its associated networks. And it is to be assumed that the legislature chose the words of Part IV of ATCSA as being apt to give effect to this object. In particular, the term "international terrorist group" in s.21 has to be read so as to reflect the reality of the way in which Al Qa'eda operates. 218. SIAC's open generic judgment contains a good deal of material which demonstrates the reality of the way in which Al Qa'eda operates, certainly in relation to the threat it poses to the United Kingdom: "96. The true emphasis, for the limit to the exercise of Part 4 powers, is on the emergency underlying the derogation… There is a risk that that phrase ["Al Qa'eda and its associated networks (and no-one else)" – Brooke LJ in A, X, Y], taken in isolation from the rest of the judgments and indeed that of the Commission, might be thought to suggest clear cut distinctions and a clear point at which the nature or number of the links to an associated group fell outside the scope of the derogation. The reality of the nature of the terrorist groups and individuals, whose activities give rise to the emergency and the derogation, does not permit such clear cut distinctions. As was pointed out in the evidence for the derogation hearings, Al Qa'eda and its associates are loosely knit, lack formal organisational structures and have links with other active terrorist organisations… 97. In the appeals, the Respondent's evidence referred regularly to the link to Al Qa'eda being created not just by national groups but by a loosely co-ordinated series of overlapping networks. They shared a broadly similar ideology, had shared training and jihad experiences and shared logistic and financial support. Mr Williams submitted that the derogation covered: '… individuals in the United Kingdom who are members of Al Qa'eda or its associated networks or are linked to members of such organisations or groups [and] are by reason of that fact part of the threat to the United Kingdom which comprises the current public emergency. That threat is compounded where they provide support for Al Qa'eda or any of the networks associated with it because they are thereby enhancing the capability of those networks.' 98. He identified groups such as the GIA and the GSPC, the EIJ, the Arab Mujahaddin in Chechnya, the Abu Doha group or network, a group or network centred around Beghal, and a wider North African network comprised of "individuals who are also previous or present members of other networks linked to Al Qa'eda (including the GSPC and the Abu http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1123.html 53/113