9.11.2017
A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 (11 August 2004)
378. Similar complaints about the relatively broad meaning given by SIAC to the words "member",
"supports" and "assists" appear to me to be ill-founded. At paragraph 113 of the generic judgment,
SIAC said:
"It may not always be clear in any given case whether someone is a member of a group, or
whether he supports or assists it. … [I]t would be unwise to lay down any hard and fast
distinctions for the purposes of the [2001] Act between membership and support and
assistance."
Again, this seems to me to be correct.
The duty to investigate the prospect of removal under s23 of the 2001 Act
379. The appellants contend that the effect of s23(1) of the 2001 Act is that the Secretary of State is
required to investigate whether another country could or would take the appellants before he could
detain them. This point arises in relation to one of the appellants, D, whose solicitors wrote to the
Treasury Solicitor stating that D was willing to go to France and invited the Secretary of State to make
"preliminary inquiries" as to whether France would take him. The Treasury Solicitor replied some five
weeks later suggesting there was no reason why D should not make those inquiries.
380. I do not understand how, as a matter of language, it can be contended that s23(1) of the 2001 Act
imposes an obligation on the Secretary of State to investigate countries which might accept someone in
respect of whom he has issued, or intends to issue, a s21 certificate. As SIAC said in paragraph 116 of
its generic decision:
"It is not for the [Secretary of State] … to contact speculative possibilities for the
appellant. … If there are obvious third countries to be investigated, we would expect the
[Secretary of State] to make some inquiries. But they may be limited where an appellant
has already left that third country, fearing that it would return him to his country of
nationality or imprison him. In reality an appellant would be expected to identify the
country to which he thought he might be able to go, if he does not wish to return to his
country of nationality directly or indirectly via a third country and has indicated a fear of
such a result."
Again, I agree.
Admissibility of statements obtained under torture
Introductory
381. Some of the evidence relied on by the Secretary of State, in order to establish that there were
reasonable grounds to satisfy s25(2)(a) in relation to some of the appellants, consisted of statements
said by them to have been obtained from individuals held by the United States at Bagram Airbase in
Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, or transferred by the United States to various countries,
including Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.
382. In civil or criminal proceedings before an English court, such a statement would hardly ever be
admissible in common law because it is hearsay, quite apart from any other reason. Particularly in civil
proceedings, there are, of course, statutory exceptions to the rule against hearsay evidence. However,
in relation to s25 appeals, it is common ground that a hearsay objection cannot be take to such
evidence. That is because of rule 44(3) of the 2003 Rules ("rule 44(3)"), which disapplies the normal
rules relating to admissibility of evidence, so far as hearings before SIAC are concerned.
383. The appellants nevertheless contend that, contrary to the conclusion reached by SIAC, these statements
should not have been admitted. This is because the appellants say that there is and was reason to
believe that the individuals concerned made the statements under torture by agents of the relevant
national (ie US, Egyptian, Jordanian or Moroccan) authorities. Accordingly, the appellants argue, these
statements could not be relied on by the Secretary of State before SIAC as evidence of "reasonable
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1123.html
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