CCPR/C/128/D/2789/2016 8.2 Regarding the claims that the author’s father was not afforded his rights under article 9 (3) of the Covenant, the Committee recalls that, in accordance with article 9 (3), anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge must be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power. The Committee also recalls that, while the exact meaning of “promptly” may vary depending on objective circumstances, delays should not exceed a few days from the time of arrest. In the view of the Committee, 48 hours is ordinarily sufficient to transport the individual and to prepare for the judicial hearing; any delay longer than 48 hours must remain absolutely exceptional and be justified under the circumstances.20 The Committee takes note of Mr. Yakovitsky’s unchallenged allegations that he was apprehended on 28 July 2015 and that he was officially notified of his placement in pretrial detention by a prosecutor on 31 July 2015, but was not brought before a judge until December 2015. The Committee recalls that, in its general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, it stated that it was inherent to the proper exercise of judicial power that such power should be exercised by an authority that was independent, objective and impartial in relation to the issues dealt with, and that a public prosecutor could not be considered as an officer authorized to exercise judicial power within the meaning of article 9 (3).21 In these circumstances, the Committee considers that the facts before it show that the author’s father was not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power, as required under article 9 (3) of the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee concludes that the above-mentioned facts reveal a violation of Mr. Yakovitsky’s rights under article 9 (3) of the Covenant. 8.3 The Committee also notes the allegations that the principle of presumption of innocence was not respected in the author’s father’s case, because he was handcuffed and kept in a cage during the court hearings, before the sentence had entered into force. In this respect, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence, as also reflected in paragraph 30 of its general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, according to which the presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt and requires that persons accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with that principle. In the same general comment, the Committee also states that defendants should normally not be shackled or kept in cages during trial, or otherwise presented to the court in a manner indicating that they may be dangerous criminals, and that media should avoid news coverage undermining the presumption of innocence. 22 On the basis of the information before it and in the absence of any other pertinent information or argumentation from the State party concerning the prevalence of the practice of handcuffing and keeping in cages defenders charged with criminal offences and its application in the present case, including the need to keep the author’s father handcuffed and in a cage throughout the court trial, the Committee considers that the facts as presented demonstrate that the right of the author’s father to be presumed innocent, as guaranteed under article 14 (2) of the Covenant, was violated. 8.4 The Committee notes the statement by the State party that the death penalty is not prohibited when imposed for the most serious crimes (see para. 4.7 above). This is provided for in article 6 (2) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, in which the Committee states that the term “most serious crimes” refers to intentional killing. The author’s father was sentenced to death after a conviction for murder, which qualifies as one of the most serious crimes. However, the Covenant also provides that stringent fair trial requirements must be met before the death penalty may be imposed, to comply with article 6 of the Covenant.23 8.5 The author claims that her father’s right to life under article 6 of the Covenant was violated, since he was sentenced to death after an unfair trial. In that respect, the Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the imposition of a sentence of death upon the conclusion of a trial in which the provisions of article 14 of the Covenant have not been respected 20 21 22 23 8 See the Committee’s general comment No. 35 (2014) on liberty and security of person, para. 33. Ibid., para. 32. See also Pustovoit v. Ukraine (CCPR/C/110/D/1405/2005), para. 9.2. General comment No. 36, paras. 35 and 41.