CAT/C/51/D/434/2010 4.25 The State party notes that the information used by the national authorities in their assessment of the complainant’s application recognized that there were significant differences in the ability of individuals to practise non-State-sanctioned Christianity from province to province within China.11 Country information indicated that while there was some risk of State action that could amount to torture under article 1 of the Convention being directed toward leaders of Christian sects that were not sanctioned by the State, the risk to general followers was low.12 Country information also indicated that religious practice, including Christianity, was becoming more widespread and public in China.13 4.26 In light of the above, the State party submits that the complainants’ claim that the main complainant would be subject to torture by Chinese Government authorities if returned to China is without merit. The State party authorities reached the considered view that his claims were not plausible and that he did not face a well-founded fear of persecution, or a real risk of torture if returned to China. It maintains that, even if he were a committed Christian, the risk of him personally suffering torture due to his religious beliefs in all of the circumstances is not real and therefore does not engage the State party’s nonrefoulement obligations. 4.27 Finally, the State party notes that the complainants appear to claim that the act of returning them to China would constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, effectively breaching article 16 of the Convention, due to the effect it would have on the main complainant’s mental health and his wife’s general health. 4.28 The State party submits that the claim of the main complainant and his wife that their removal from Australia per se would constitute a violation of article 16 of the Convention is inadmissible, as insufficient evidence has been provided to demonstrate that they would suffer severe pain so as to meet the threshold for constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This is consistent with the Committee’s decision in A.A.C. v. Sweden where the Committee concluded “that the aggravation of the complainant’s state of health which might be caused by his deportation is in itself insufficient to substantiate this claim, which is accordingly considered inadmissible”.14 Consequently, the effect on the complainants’ health, should they be returned to China, would not amount to treatment inconsistent with article 16 of the Convention. 4.29 The State party submits that it has undertaken appropriate steps to ensure the complainants were fit to travel prior to removal action taking place. It notes that an assessment carried out on 29 September 2010, at the instigation of the International Organization for Migration and by independent psychologists, found that the main complainant was fit to travel. A similar assessment conducted on 26 July 2010 also found him fit to travel. 4.30 Further, the State party notes that the complainants have failed to provide evidence, such as medical certificates or opinions, to specify the precise nature of Ms. Zhang’s alleged medical condition. It reiterates that, prior to any future removal action, the complainants would undergo independent medical assessment to ensure that they were fit to travel. 11 12 13 14 10 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2011 Annual Report, p. 126. Ibid. Ibid, p. 125. Communication No. 227/2003, decision adopted on 16 November 2006, para. 7.3. See also, communication No. 083/1997, GRB v. Sweden, Views adopted on 15 May 1998, para. 6.7.