CAT/C/35/D/250/2004 Page 11 complainant explains that, in the light of his past experience, he assumed that the 1997 expulsion order was just another “cruel technicality” which would entrap him on appeal, as the Svea Court of Appeal would overturn the expulsion order but impose a heavier prison sentence. For these reasons, he decided not to challenge the part of the judgment which imposed the penalty, but to limit his challenge to the expulsion order by filing an application with the Governme nt. On 11 June 1997, the Government decided that there was no impediment to implementing the expulsion order. That same day, the complainant applied for legal aid to have the deportation order quashed, which was rejected by the Government. The complainant lodged a complaint with the Swedish Ombudsman on 7 March 1997 and again requested the Government on 25 April 1997 to quash the expulsion order; both were dismissed. 5.8 The complainant claims that the European Court of Human Rights rejected his application on procedural grounds, without having examined the merits. He concludes that his complaint could not be deemed to have been “examined” under another proceeding of international investigation, and that it is admissible. Furthermore, after the European Court of Human Rights handed down its judgment, the Swedish Government granted a temporary residence permit to the complainant on 5 November 1998, which is said to constitute an implicit acknowledgement that there were impediments to implementing the deport ation order. 5.9 Concerning the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the complainant asserts that the removal of his name from the Swedish Population Registry on 25 January 1988, the alleged revocation of his permanent residence permit on 10 May 1995, and the issuance of a new expulsion decision on 7 January 1997 were a plot to unfairly and unlawfully deprive him of his asylum status. For him, the purpose of the 1997 judgment of the Uppsala District Court was to force him to seek a remedy from the higher court which would unlawfully increase his punishment. He points out that he had already complained against the Uppsala District Court’s expulsion decision early in 1993, and that the Svea Courts of Appeals had already overturned this decision. For him, the Uppsala District Court was not authorized to issue a second expulsion order when the first expulsion order had been overturned by a higher court according to law. He was convinced that complaining to the same authority would be futile and useless. The Svea Court of Appeal would undoubtedly have overturned the Uppsala District Court’s decision but, in doing so, it would have also unlawfully increased the length of his imprisonment. The complainant afirms that he had exhausted all legal remedies in Swedish courts and that he immediately proceeded to exhaust fully all other domestic remedies available to him. He submitted numerous complaints to the Swedish Government and the Swedish Parliament’s Ombudsman to have the expulsion order quashed. He further explains that his decision not to appeal to the Svea Court of Appeal was based on the extreme stress, trauma and shock he was experiencing at that moment. 5.10 The complainant argues that the complaint raises questions of facts and law of such a complex nature that their determination requires an examination of the merits. State party’s further comments on the admissibility of the case: