CAT/C/35/D/250/2004 Page 12 6.1 By note of 18 March 2005, the State party insists that the complaint should be declared inadmissible for non exhaustion of domestic remedies. It challenges the complainant’s allegation that applications to the Government and the Parliamentary Ombudsman can replace an appeal to the ordinary courts for purposes of exhaustion of domestic remedies. A petition to the Government is an extraordinary remedy that cannot replace an appeal to the ordinary courts. The State party recalls that the European Commission held that the gist of the complainant’s allegations could have been made already at the level of criminal proceedings against him, ultimately resulting in a request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The State party argues that, since the European Commission concluded that the complainant’s petition to the Government could not be considered a remedy for purposes of admissibility, the Committee should do likewise. 6.2 The complainant’s submissions to the Parliamentary Ombudsman cannot rectify his omission to appeal the expulsion order. The Parliamentary Ombudsman is not competent to set aside courts decis ions; thus, a complaint to this body can hardly be considered capable of bringing adequate and effective redress. 6.3 With regard to further circumstances invoked by the complainant, the State party recalls that article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Conve ntion and Rule 107 of the Rules of Procedure only stipulates two permissible grounds for failing to exhaust domestic remedies: i.e. that the remedies are unreasonably prolonged or are unlikely to bring effective relief. The State party maintains that there is no basis for finding that either of these grounds applies to the present case. It recalls that the Committee has observed that, in principle, it is not within its purview to evaluate the prospect of success of domestic remedies, but only to ascertain whether they are proper remedies for the determination of a complainant’s claim. Concerning the complainant’s case, the State party also recalls that in 1993 the Svea Court of Appeal had ruled in favour of the complainant and set aside the first expulsion order issued against him. 6.4 Concerning the complainant’s allegation that he chose not to appeal the expulsion order because of the risk that the prison sentence would be increased arbitrarily if the expulsion order was repealed, the State party considers it irrelevant to the assessment of whether the appeal was likely to bring effective relief or not. Since the expulsion order depends directly on the existence of an alleged risk of torture, there would no longer be any basis for the complainant’s claim if the order was set aside. Furthermore, the State party observes that, under the Swedish Penal Code, the expulsion order operates as a mitigating factor in the determination of appropriate punishment. If the expulsion order was later set aside, the releva nt sentence would be increased. In any case, punishment is determined according to the severity of the crime, and it cannot be said to be “arbitrary” or “disproportionate”. 6.5 Concerning the complainant’s allegation that his mental condition at the time of the District Court of Uppsala’s judgment prevented him from appealing, the State party notes that this is not a circumstance that would absolve the complainant from exhausting domestic remedies.