CCPR/C/112/D/2325/2013 7.2 Moreover, the State party provides an explanation for the irregularities alleged by the author in respect of the Court of Appeal ruling of 8 November 2013. It draws the Committee’s attention to the fact that the author finally admitted that the ruling had indeed been sent to him. It recalls that the author’s appeal on points of law was registered on 13 November 2013 and adds that it made sense that a letter was sent after receipt of the appeal, as doing so would form part of the course of constituting the file, in the same way as other procedures such as payment of the cost of copying the file. The State party refutes the author’s allegation that the copy of the ruling sent to him was not signed. It explains that copies of decisions are sent out unsigned and that only originals, filed in the court registry and designated “Minutes”, are signed. The registry issues certified true copies of originals by affixing a seal on the last page of the decision, which guarantees the authenticity of the document. Moreover, the State party declares that the ruling that was sent to the author was not modified in any way after it was handed down and that it contains a number of reasoned paragraphs dealing with the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.24 7.3 With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State party refers to article 37, paragraph (a), of Act No. 2006/016 of 29 December 2006 on the organization and functioning of the Supreme Court, which provides that the “Judicial Chamber is competent to deal with appeals against final rulings handed down by courts and tribunals in civil, commercial, criminal and social cases and in cases involving traditional law.” The State party indicates that the author’s understanding of the term “final ruling” is incorrect, in that a final ruling may be subject only to an appeal on points of law, while a first instance decision may be subject to appeal. It indicates that cassation was indeed the course available in respect of the Court of Appeal ruling. 7.4 Lastly, the State party recalls that the author confirms in his comments that he had been granted release on bail, although he had avoided doing so in his previous submissions. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 8.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Human Rights Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 8.2 As required under article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol, the Committee has ascertained that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 8.3 The Committee notes that the State party contests the admissibility of the communication on the grounds that domestic remedies have not been exhausted as defined in article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol. 8.4 The Committee notes the author’s claims under article 9, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Covenant regarding his allegedly unlawful and arbitrary arrest, police custody and detention and his claims under article 14, paragraph 3 (c), regarding the excessive length of the habeas corpus proceedings before the national courts. The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the author has not exhausted domestic remedies given that he 24 14 The State further refers to the following excerpts: “The discussion that Kandem Foumbi believed he must engage in about failing to fulfil the conditions of flagrancy is beyond the competence of a habeas corpus judge and falls within the jurisdiction of a trial judge …” ; “The place in which the funds were remitted and the starting point of the alleged statute of limitations were discussed; a habeas corpus judge would not be able to adjudicate on these issues without exceeding his competence.” GE.14-23228 (E)