CCPR/C/112/D/2083/2011 Committee in connection with the implementation of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation” and its additional memorandum, reiterated that it contested the admissibility of the communication. Authors’ comments on the State party’s observations 6.1 On 12 March 2012, the author submitted comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility and provided additional arguments on the merits of the complaint. 6.2 The author points out that the State party has recognized the competence of the Committee to consider individual communications. This competence is of a general nature and its exercise by the Committee is not subject to the discretion of the State party. In particular, it is not for the State party to determine whether it is appropriate for the Committee to take up a specific case. That is for the Committee to decide when it considers the communication. The author is of the view that the adoption by the State party of a comprehensive domestic settlement mechanism cannot be applied in respect of the Human Rights Committee or constitute grounds for declaring the communication inadmissible. In the present case, the legislative measures adopted amount to a violation of the rights enshrined in the Covenant, as the Committee has previously observed.13 6.3 The author recalls that the State party’s declaration of a state of emergency on 9 February 1992 does not affect the right of persons to submit individual communications to the Committee. Article 4 of the Covenant allows for derogations from certain provisions of the Covenant during states of emergency, but does not affect the exercise of rights under the Optional Protocol. 6.4 The author again refers to the State party’s argument that the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies calls on the author to institute criminal proceedings by filing a complaint with the investigating judge and suing for damages, in accordance with articles 72 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He recalls that this procedure, if it is not to be declared inadmissible, is subject to the payment of a surety or “procedural fee”, the amount of which is set arbitrarily by the investigating judge. He considers that the procedure represents a financial deterrent to the persons concerned who, furthermore, have no guarantee that it will actually result in proceedings being initiated. The author considers that, given the serious nature of the alleged offences, it was the responsibility of the competent authorities to take up the case. The author refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence in this respect.14 6.5 The author reiterates that, following the arrest of his son, he tried to find out from the security forces what had happened to him, to no avail. He also informed the prosecution services of the court of Constantine and the national judicial, governmental and human rights institutions in order for investigations to be carried out. At no time did any of these authorities ever conduct an investigation into the alleged violations. Consequently, the author and his family cannot be reproached for not having exhausted domestic remedies since it was the State party that failed to carry out the necessary investigations incumbent upon it. 6.6 The author also recalls the ban, pursuant to article 45 of Ordinance No. 06-01, on bringing any individual or collective proceedings against members of Algeria’s defence and 13 14 10 The author refers to the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the third periodic report of Algeria (CCPR/C/DZA/CO/3), paras. 7, 8 and 13. He also cites Boucherf v. Algeria, para. 11, and to the concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the third periodic report of Algeria (CAT/C/DZA/CO/3), adopted on 13 May 2008, paras. 11, 13 and 17. Lastly, the author refers to general comment No. 29 (2001) of the Human Rights Committee on derogations from the Covenant during a state of emergency, para. 1. Benaziza v. Algeria, para. 8.3. GE.14-22365