1. Reparations programmes are meant to (partially) redress gross and systematic human rights violations, not sporadic or exceptional ones. This has far-reaching consequences. It implies that the universe of potential beneficiaries is large and that they probably suffered various and multiple forms of abuse. It also means that a reparations programme cannot make the same contribution to strengthening the rule of law as it would if it were redressing exceptional violations of otherwise generally observed norms. Part of what needs to be redressed in the cases that are of concern here is not only a large number of individual violations, but violations that come about in systematic ways, either as a consequence of the deliberate adoption of abusive policies or as a predictable consequence of other choices. Reparations in these contexts must not only do justice to the victims, but also contribute to re-establishing essential systems of norms, including norms of justice, which are inevitably weakened during times of conflict or authoritarianism. 2. The contexts in which reparations programmes are established are frequently characterized by weak institutional capacity, fractured social relations, very low levels of trust and a scarcity of financial resources. 3. There is much less familiarity with reparations than with other redress mechanisms, especially criminal justice. With the exception of a few, mostly specialized NGOs,16 human rights NGOs in situations of gross and systematic violations usually devote most of their energy to issues of basic legal protection, and much less to questions of reparations, which, in the midst of abuses always, understandably, seem nothing more than a distant possibility. Similarly, victims and victims’ groups typically worry first and foremost about survival and recovery (of health, information, remains, etc.). Few Governments have had to deal with massive reparations in the past, and therefore few have any expertise. In fact, there is a lack of expertise at every level, including in the international and donor communities. As a result, expectations concerning reparations—which are also subject to other influences17—tend to be unrealistic and managing these expectations is always one of the greatest challenges in the design phase of reparations efforts. 4. The violations that reparations benefits are meant to redress are frequently of the sort that is, strictly speaking, irreparable. Nothing will restore a victim to the status quo ante after years of torture and illegal detention, or after the loss of a parent, a sibling, a spouse or a child. No amount of money and no combination of benefits can erase either such experiences or some of their consequences. This is no excuse for inaction. However, understanding the inherent limitations of the programmes in question affects the way they are established and run, the benefits they distribute, etc. 16 17 Redress, for example, has a long and distinguished history dealing with reparation (www.redress.org). Decisions by regional human rights bodies play an important role in setting expectations. In Latin America, for example, decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have been crucial not only for providing redress to individual victims, but also for motivating States parties to establish broader reparations programmes for other victims. The incentive effect of these decisions is, however, a result of the level of compensation that they provide. This level is seldom met by broader programmes, but these decisions do raise expectations among the victims. 10