4.11 As for the alleged violation of article 16, the State party asserts that the complainant has utterly failed to establish that the hearing before the Refugee Protection Division constituted such a violation. It avers that the allegations of bias on the part of members of the Division, based on the questions that they put to the complainant, are without foundation. The State party concludes that the Committee should accordingly find the communication inadmissible. 4.12 The State party recalls the Federal Court’s conclusion that the complainant had not demonstrated that the decision by the Refugee Protection Division was based on an error of fact, or on an arbitrary finding, or that it failed to take account of the available evidence. It notes that the Federal Court affirmed that the complainant had not demonstrated bias on the part of members of the panel. It adds that the standard set by article 3 of the Convention was applied by the national authorities in assessing the risk to the complainant of deporting him, and that the Committee should not rely instead on its own conclusions. 4.13 The State party points out that facts and evidence are for national authorities to assess, and that the Committee should not re-evaluate findings of fact or review the application of national legislation. It invokes the case law of the Human Rights Committee, which is on record as saying that it is not that Committee’s place to question the evaluation of evidence by the domestic courts unless the evaluation amounted to a denial of justice,c a precedent that should also be accepted by the Committee against Torture. 4.14 The State party concludes that the communication is without foundation, and that the complainant has not demonstrated a violation of articles 3 and 16 of the Convention. Complainant’s comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility and merits 5.1 In observations dated 9 November 2003, the complainant maintains that he did avail himself of the option of requesting a judicial review of the decision denying him refugee status, and that that was the final remedy. The principal remedy available to him was judicial review of the refusal to grant him refugee status in March 1998. 5.2 The complainant observes that his case was cited in a study prepared by a multidisciplinary group on shortcomings in the Canadian system of public hearings for refugees in Canada, in October 2000. The hearing at which he appeared was apparently a travesty, and his case was reportedly perceived as an example of abuse in the conduct of oral proceedings. 5.3 In response to the State party’s argument concerning the possibility of judicial review of the decision to deny him relief on humanitarian grounds, the complainant asserts that such a remedy would be based on the same facts as his application for refugee status. He emphasizes the futility, in his case, of seeking such a remedy when the Federal Court has already taken a position on the merits of the case. It is inconceivable that such an appeal would have provided effective relief. And the general rule of exhausting domestic remedies requires only that remedies offering effective relief be exhausted. 5.4 The complainant notes that the new procedure, termed pre-removal risk assessment by the Government of Canada, was not in existence prior to mid-June 2002 and was thus not available to him. He claims that this procedure does not respect Canada’s obligations under international law or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, owing to the absence of an independent decision-making mechanism and a lack of impartiality. 107