up these certificates in a systematic manner, so that no patient ever appears before any judge whatsoever. It is to be hoped that the thoughts that inspire this inopportune (and totally illegal) resistance will return to their senses. The intervention of the judge in these matters is justified and irreversible. Moreover, there are questions concerning the role of judges and the nature of the supervision that they exercise over ASPDRE and ASPDT 147 committal decisions. Many judges interviewed by the Contrôleur général have a clear view: their role is to determine whether the grounds given in decisions or opinions supporting coercive measures indeed justify the latter. However, other judges demand greater precision with regard to their role. Thus, at the time of the annual general meeting of the union of hospital psychiatrists on 2 nd October 2012, one of them demanded “legislation on treatment of outpatients under constraint and the possibility for the judge to substitute compulsory outpatient treatment for hospitalisation, rather than having the choice between maintaining the measure and its discharge pure and simple” 148. Yet currently, when judges to whom cases are referred order discharge, they can already suspend the effect of their ruling for twenty-four hours (maximum), in order to allow an alternative treatment programme to be prepared. Similarly, the role of the liberty and custody judge (JLD) 149 is sometimes disputed. It is considered that their lack of experience of mental health prejudices their role and can cause them to take unjustified decisions: many cases are cited in which rash discharge decisions have been taken, sometimes forcing the professionals to improvise rather unorthodox emergency solutions, in order to keep the beneficiary with them. Calls are made for the judge responsible for guardianship orders to take their place. However, this demand is questionable. If intervention by the judiciary, the “guardian of individual liberty” 150, is only justified because committal procedures constitute a deprivation of liberty, it is clear that the role of the JLD is justified by virtue of this logic alone, the latter necessarily being a judge with great experience, if not with regard to mental health, at least in matters of individual liberty151, which is just as important as far as this question is concerned152. In this domain, they obviously sit as civil judges153. The arguments for change in this regard are not convincing. Finally, questions remain on the procedures adopted. Without here being exhaustive, two factors can be quoted. The first concerns medical professional secrecy and confidentiality of treatment. The details of medical data and behaviour can only be set out to the patient and to third parties, who may possibly be concerned – such as persons having requested ASPDTs – with great precaution, which should be motivated in priority by respect for the dignity of the patient in distress. This consideration should be given priority over any other. This rule is generally applied. However, the inspectors have been led to understand that in certain scenarios this requirement is ignored, at the cost of great subsequent difficulties for the patients in question. The second factor concerns conditions of appearance in court. Under current law three possibilities are open: the hearing may take place in a normal manner at a court of first instance; the judge may however 147 Committal to psychiatric treatment at the request of a third party (formerly hospitalisation à la demande d’un tiers “hospitalisation at the request of a third party”). 148 Speech by Mrs VALTON, vice-chair of the Union syndicale des magistrats (French trade union for members of the national legal service). 149 With regard to whom, because of the role conferred upon them by the Act of 5th July 2011, there are calls from many quarters that their title should be changed to “liberty judge”, which indeed appears natural, and therefore desirable. 150 Article 66 of the French Constitution. 151 Cf. second paragraph of article 137-1 of the code of criminal procedure. 152 It would be paradoxical to exclude judges, with expertise in questions of liberty, on the grounds that they are not specialists in mental health, while maintaining the role of prefects, who are no more expert in mental health than judges, but are rather “specialists” in public order. 153 Article L. 213-8 of the code of judicial organisation (code de l’organisation judiciaire) and first paragraph of article L. 3211-12-2 of the public health code (code de la santé publique). 66