CAT/C/63/D/488/2012 jurisprudence, any assessment of the risk of torture must be carried out in the light of the information that was possessed, or ought to have been possessed, by the authorities of the State party before the expulsion took place, while information obtained thereafter “is relevant only to assess what the State party actually knew, or could have deduced, about the risk of torture at the time the complainant was expelled”.16 The evaluation of the risks of torture made prior to a person’s deportation should not be confused with any ill-treatment that the complainant claims to have suffered after he was handed over to the Rwandan authorities. The complainant has not provided the Committee with any new evidence regarding his treatment since his arrival in Rwanda that might lead to the conclusion that the State party actually knew, or could have deduced, that there was a risk of torture at the time of his expulsion. 6.3 The State party reiterates that its national authorities conducted a thorough analysis of the risks that the complainant claimed that he would face and that it is not the role of the Committee to act as a fourth instance, unless to demonstrate arbitrariness or a denial of justice.17 6.4 On the merits, the State party reiterates that the complainant’s allegations do not indicate a violation of article 3 of the Convention, given that a risk of torture was not established or foreseeable prior to his extradition and that, thereafter, the material that he has submitted does not support the finding of a violation of the prohibition of torture within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. The claims that he has received death threats and fears for his life have not been corroborated. 6.5 The State party specifies that it obtained assurances from Rwanda that the complainant’s case would be considered and handled as a transfer under article 24 of the Act concerning transfer of cases. Consequently, when the complainant was returned, the State party expected him to enjoy the same guarantees and safeguards as those provided for by the Transfer Act for defendants transferred by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The State party recalls that, as an additional precautionary measure, it received clear diplomatic assurances from Rwanda before returning the complainant, even though the Canadian authorities had concluded that he would not face a risk of torture. Furthermore, in his comments, the complainant provides no credible evidence that Rwanda has failed to honour its diplomatic assurances since then. Additional comments by the complainant 7.1 On 16 May 2016, the complainant submitted his comments on the State party’s observations of 28 February 2012. He maintained that his trial in Rwanda started on 12 September 2012. On 15 April 2016, the High Court of Rwanda sentenced him to life imprisonment for public incitement to genocide and persecution and inculcation of hatred based on ethnicity, and acquitted him of the charges of conspiracy to commit genocide and complicity in genocide. 7.2 The complainant challenges the decision of the Minister’s delegate to return him to Rwanda on the grounds that he disregarded evidence of the risk of torture and failed to use objective criteria in the risk analysis; he further asserts that the decision to expel him was emotional in nature. He considers the decision to return him to Rwanda to have been arbitrary and is of the view that it was taken without considering the real, personal and foreseeable risk of torture that he faces, especially in view of the systematic and flagrant commission of mass violations of human rights. In choosing to determine whether he was “highly likely” to face a risk of torture, the State party failed to follow the guidance of the Committee, according to which it should simply have determined whether the complainant was “likely” to run a risk of torture. The complainant further maintains that the risk of torture was foreseeable for the State party, particularly in view of the arbitrary detentions and abuse of prisoners that have occurred in Rwanda, the fact that torture was not punishable under the Rwandan Penal Code at the time of his removal and the complainant’s status as a political opponent. The State party should have prosecuted him in Canada under 16 17 10 Sogi v. Canada (CAT/C/39/D/297/2006), para. 10.8. P.E. v. France (CAT/C/29/D/193/2001), para. 6.5. GE.18-15056