CAT/C/63/D/488/2012 Consideration of the merits 11.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 11.2 In accordance with article 3 of the Convention, the Committee must determine whether or not there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant was in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to Rwanda. The Committee observes, at the outset, that in cases where a person has been expelled prior to the consideration of the complaint, the Committee assesses what the State party knew or should have known at the time of expulsion. Information obtained after the person’s removal is relevant only to the assessment of what the State party actually knew, or could have deduced, about the risk of torture at the time the complainant was expelled.21 11.3 In order to determine whether or not there were substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to Rwanda, the Committee must take account of all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass human rights violations. However, the aim of its deliberations is to determine whether or not the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he was to be returned. Additional evidence must therefore be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass human rights violations in a country does not, in itself, constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country; there must be additional grounds for concluding that the risk of torture was of a personal nature. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant human rights violations does not mean that a person might not be considered to be at risk of being subjected to torture given his or her particular circumstances. 22 11.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, wherein it states that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. Although the risk does not have to be shown to be “highly probable”, the burden of proof generally falls on the complainant, who must present an arguable case establishing that he or she is at “foreseeable, personal, present and real” risk. The Committee further recalls that it gives considerable weight to findings of fact made by organs of the State party concerned, while, at the same time, it is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, under article 22 (4) of the Convention, to make a free assessment of the information available to it, taking into account all the circumstances relevant to each case. 23 11.5 The Committee notes the complainant’s assertion that he is considered to be a political opponent of the Government of Rwanda and that the risk of torture was thus real, and that the Canadian authorities, including the Minister’s delegate, made a deliberate decision to deny that he would face a risk of torture in Rwanda and relied too heavily on the diplomatic assurances that they received. The Committee also takes note of the contents of the documentation provided by the complainant to support his claim that he is at risk of torture and that the right to a defence of persons charged with genocide is not respected. The Committee further takes note of the author’s claim that the fact that his case has received so much attention in the media increases his risk of torture. Lastly, the Committee notes that, since his return to Rwanda, the complainant alleges that his right to a fair trial has been violated, that his access to counsel and to his family has been restricted, that he has been deprived of food, sleep and medical assistance and that he has been subjected to poor prison conditions and to intimidation from secret service agents in the prison. 21 22 23 GE.18-15056 Sogi v. Canada, para. 10.8; Tebourski v. France, (CAT/C/38/D/300/2006), para. 8.1; Agiza v. Sweden (CAT/C/34/D/233/2003), para. 13.2; and Kalinichenko v. Morocco, para. 15.2. S.P.A. v. Canada (CAT/C/37/D/282/2005); T.I. v. Canada (CAT/C/45/D/333/2007); and A.M.A v. Switzerland (CAT/C/45/D/344/2008). See general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, paras. 11, 38 and 50. 13