CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 and effectiveness so that a woman can demand from the authorities the guarantee of her right to a legal abortion within the limited time period that circumstances require. 2.15 The remedy of amparo under the Constitution does not meet the necessary time frame to ensure effective action. Under the norms governing this proceeding, it takes somewhere between 62 and 102 days to reach a final decision, after all prior remedies have been exhausted. Furthermore, application for this remedy is subject to the exhaustion of all prior remedies, in this case the hospital’s refusal to perform the abortion. In the case of L.C., that period exceeded the time period within which she could effectively enjoy that right without risking even more harm to her life and health. When the first refusal to perform the abortion was received she was already 16 weeks pregnant and, had the appeal been heard, she would have been 20 weeks pregnant by that time. There would have been no sense in applying for amparo after that point, since by the time a final and enforceable decision would have been likely to be taken L.C. would have been more than 28 weeks pregnant. Furthermore, although the norms establish a procedure that in theory should take somewhere between 62 and 102 days, in reality, amparo proceedings generally take years to resolve. In this regard, the author recalls the decision of the Human Rights Committee in the case of K.N.L.H. v. Peru, also concerning the refusal to perform a therapeutic abortion on a woman pregnant with an anencephalic foetus, where the Committee did not consider the amparo proceeding to be an effective remedy that must be exhausted.4 The complaint 3.1 The author states that the refusal by the doctors at the hospital to perform the therapeutic abortion violated the rights of L.C. to health, a life of dignity and to be free from discrimination in access to such care. L.C. was deprived of the possibility of walking again by the unjustified withdrawal of a surgical intervention that was totally necessary. The failure of the health system in the State party to ensure access to essential services for women, such as abortion, compromises its obligations under the Convention. The State party has not met its obligations, by failing to provide a legal medical service required only by women, and on which the victim’s physical and mental health depended. This violation was aggravated by the fact that L.C. was a minor; in that respect the State had a double duty to protect her. Nor had the State party provided adequate and effective guarantees in its legislation to protect those rights. 3.2 The author maintains that the facts described constitute a violation of articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 12 and 16, paragraph 1 (e), of the Convention, as well as general recommendation No. 24 on women and health. 5 3.3 With respect to article 5, the author states that conditioning timely access to a medical treatment, on which the exercise of the right to health, life and a life of dignity depended, on continuing an unwanted pregnancy resulted in discriminatory treatment based on the stereotype of prioritizing the reproductive function of L.C. above her welfare. As for article 12, the author claims that since L.C.’s pregnancy constituted a threat to her physical and mental health, therapeutic abortion was appropriate and necessary. The medical needs of L.C. and the due protection of her right of access to both physical and mental health without discrimination were totally ignored by those whose duty it was to guarantee those rights. The author also claims that the refusal to provide the legal health service of termination of pregnancy violates the right to decide the number and spacing of children provided in article 16 (e). Furthermore, the lack of administrative and judicial mechanisms 4 5 See communication No. 1153/2003, K.N.L.H. v. Peru, Views of 24 October 2005, para. 5.2. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 38 (A/54/38/Rev.1), chap. I, sect. A. 5