CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 greater importance than her human rights, the State party violated articles 1 and 12 of the Convention. 7.8 The author recalls the decision of the Human Rights Committee in the case K.N.L.H. v. Peru in which it concluded that there had been a violation of article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Lack of an effective remedy to demand that legal termination of pregnancy be provided 7.9 The hospital director, in the notification by which he convened the first meeting of the medical board, did not ask it whether the continuation of the pregnancy would cause grave and permanent harm to the health of L.C., but rather asked: (a) if the spinal surgery could be performed without compromising the life of the child; (b) if the pregnancy of a patient with this medical diagnosis endangered the life of the mother; and (c) if the child, under these conditions, could be born with serious or permanent defects. Nevertheless, from the author’s request and article 119 of the Penal Code it is clear that the request for an abortion was related to the serious and permanent harm involved in continuing the pregnancy. The questions, however, focused the discussion on harm to the foetus, which ensured an opinion that was practically a foregone conclusion and did not find a need to perform a therapeutic abortion. No one mentioned the effect that continuing to postpone the surgery would have on L.C.’s prospects for recovery, nor the harm to her mental health. Only the third meeting of the medical board, held on 19 May 2007, was convened for the purpose of determining whether, given the medical condition of L.C., the termination of pregnancy was warranted. However, it was not made explicit that this request should be evaluated in the light of the harm to L.C.’s physical and mental health that the indefinite postponement of the surgery and the imposition of motherhood would cause. Finally, despite not having discussed the causes for which the therapeutic abortion was requested, the board determined that the termination of pregnancy would not be performed. The author was only informed of this decision 11 days later, that is, 42 days after her request. 7.10 The author reiterates her arguments with respect to the lack of effective judicial and administrative remedies in addressing requests for termination of pregnancy in the State party. This is relevant not only as a ground for admissibility in the present case, but also as grounds for the violation of articles 2 (c) and (f), 3 and 5 of the Convention. 7.11 In Peru there is no legislation or regulation on access to therapeutic abortion, with the result that each hospital determines arbitrarily what requirements are necessary, under what procedures cases requesting it will be decided, the time limits for making the decision and the level of importance placed on the views of the pregnant woman regarding the risks to her health that she is prepared to assume. The author recalls the Committee’s general recommendation No. 24, which states that it is discriminatory for a State party to refuse to legally provide for the performance of certain reproductive health services for women (para. 11), and that the State is obliged to establish a system that guarantees effective judicial action to deal with any such discrimination (para. 13). 7.12 The lack of legislative and administrative measures regulating access to therapeutic abortion condemns women to legal insecurity insofar as protection of their rights is completely at the mercy of gender prejudices and stereotypes, as shown in the present case. The sociocultural pattern based on a stereotypical function of a woman and her reproductive capacity guided the medical decision on which the physical and mental integrity of L.C. depended, subjecting her to discrimination by placing her on an unequal footing with men with respect to the enjoyment of her human rights. The State’s omissions and negligence in regulating access to therapeutic abortion created the conditions allowing agents of the State to discriminate against L.C. and prevented her access to the medical treatment she required, which also constitutes a violation of articles 1 and 12 of the Convention. 12