E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.2 page 15 3. Status of judges 40. The status of judges is currently regulated by articles 29 ff. of Legislative Decree No. 13 of 1971, as amended by Legislative Decrees No. 17 of 1977, No. 4 of 1999 and No. 19 of 2000 on the organization of the judiciary. These instruments stipulate that judges are chosen from among persons (Bahrainis and even foreigners) who satisfy the conditions prescribed by law. They are appointed by the Minister of Justice either directly to the High Court or to the lower courts. The appointments are not made on a competitive basis, nor even are judges subject to an aptitude test; the selection of candidates is at the discretion of the competent authorities. The removal of judges is subject to the same considerations. 41. The supreme council of the judiciary called for in the 1973 Constitution to supervise the judicial branch has only just been established. Before 2000, judges were under the direct authority of the Minister of Justice, who was authorized to supervise them, take disciplinary measures against them and recommend their removal. It was Legislative Decree No. 19 of 2000, cited above, which gave effect to the new Constitutional provisions establishing the Higher Judicial Council. The Council is composed exclusively of legal officers serving ex officio: the chief justice of the Court of Cassation (presiding); the chief justice and two most senior judges of the High Court of Appeal, the chief justice of the Shariah Court of Appeal (Sunni branch), the chief justice of the Shariah Court of Appeal (Jaafari branch), and the chief justice of the High Court. 42. All the powers which were formerly vested in the Minister of Justice now lie with the Higher Judicial Council. It supervises the work of judges, manages their careers, and recommends appointments and promotions. It carries out inspections and takes disciplinary action against judges. Legislative Decree No. 19 draws a clear dividing line between the executive branch, represented by the Minister of Justice, and judges’ work and career development. 43. The Working Group is of the view that this reform is a great step forward, showing how much things are changing in Bahrain. It welcomes this development and invites the authorities to speed up the introduction of mechanisms to give practical effect to the independence of the judiciary, the basic principles of which are enshrined in the National Charter. 44. The Working Group believes it should point out, however, that in the delegation’s meetings with lawyers and representatives of civil society, reservations were voiced about the relative independence of the Higher Judicial Council. These informants believed that so long as appointment to the judiciary was not competitive but remained at the discretion of the authorities, the independence of judges was compromised, especially given that Council members were appointed ex officio from among the various chief justices who had close ties to the ruling political class and were thus insufficiently representative of the pluralistic nature of society. 45. During their meetings, the members of the delegation also learned that the presence of foreigners in the judiciary (Egyptians and Sudanese, for instance) was not always appreciated. Some professionals stated that recourse to foreign judges, which in the past could be justified by the dearth of Bahraini lawyers, was now resented, particularly by the Shi’ite majority; Shi’ite