CAT/C/40/D/293/2006 page 6 substantiate the alleged risks. The lack of evidence also prompted the deciding officer to reject the allegation based on the state of health of the complainant, since the latter had failed to prove that he would be unable to receive the necessary treatment in Mexico. 4.5 The complainant submitted a second PRRA application on 12 April 2006, in which he argued that his daughter-in-law, Mrs. V.V.J., had obtained refugee status in Canada and that her asylum application was based entirely on his story and testimony. He also alleged, for the first time, that Mr. O.E.V., the former Mayor of Mexico City, was behind the death threats that he had allegedly received in Mexico. The PRRA officer who had rejected his application noted that each request for protection was a specific case and that he was not bound by the conclusions reached by CISR in the daughter-in-law’s case. The officer noted that the complainant had not produced all the evidence and documents that had been submitted to CISR in support of the daughter-in-law’s asylum application. In particular, he had not provided her personal information form, which would have shown the exact grounds given in her application. CISR had given her the benefit of the doubt, despite certain discrepancies in her statement, on account of the fact that she was a young woman living on her own in Mexico, and in implementation of the “Chairperson’s Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution”. The PRRA officer further noted that the asylum application of the daughter-in-law was not based exclusively on the complainant’s allegations and testimony. His son had also submitted an affidavit in support of the application, in which he mentioned threats and persecution, which were not shown to be linked with the complainant. It was therefore unclear which testimony CISR had used as a basis for granting the daughter-in-law refugee status. The PRRA officer concluded that the complainant had failed to show a link between the former mayor’s legal troubles and the problems that the complainant allegedly had with the managers of the vehicle pounds where he had worked. The officer also noted that the complainant had not raised the issue of the risk before and that the evidence did not support the allegation. The complainants did not challenge the dismissal of their PRRA application before the Federal Court. 4.6 Regarding the second application on humanitarian grounds, the deciding officer noted that the complainant had completed his medical treatment in April 2006 and had declared himself fit for work. Although he claimed that he needed aftercare and access to appropriate medical services, he provided no details as to the aftercare and medical services which he allegedly required. On the issue of the complainants’ links with Canada, the PRRA officer noted that the complainants were not financially independent in Canada and that they had provided no evidence of their alleged integration into the community. The deciding officer therefore concluded that, under the circumstances, return to Mexico would not cause the complainants any unusual and unjustified or excessive difficulties. 4.7 The State party maintains that the complaint is incompatible with article 22 of the Convention, since the alleged risks do not constitute torture for the purposes of the Convention. Torture, as defined in article 1, requires that the suffering be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”. In the present instance, it has not been shown that the persecuting agent is a public official or is acting in an official capacity. By all accounts Mr. O.E.V. does not perform a public function in Mexico and does not act in an official capacity on behalf of the Mexican authorities. Regarding Mr. O.E.V.’s alleged “collaborators”, the complainants have not furnished any evidence to show that those persons are public officials or persons acting in an official capacity.