78 In NOU 1988: 37 Ny fengselslov (‘New prison act’), it was proposed that the regime be discontinued.240 The super­visory councils were also mentioned in Report No 37 to the Storting (2007–2008) Straff som virker (‘­Punishement that works’), where the Ministry ­recommended that the supervisory regime be reviewed to determine the degree to which it constituted ‘an active control body with the competence and ­resources to ensure adequate transparency in the ­Correctional Service’s activities. Both the practical ­aspects and the principles governing supervisory activities should be considered’.241 After the report to the Storting, the Ministry indicated that an assessment of the supervisory councils would be initiated. Since then, there has been an ongoing process at ministerial and directorate level, but it has not resulted in any amendment of the supervisory scheme. In Norway’s seventh periodic report to the UN Committee against Torture, which was submitted in 2011, the state authorities wrote that the regime of supervisory councils was not satisfactory and that the system must be reviewed.242 In 2011, the Parliamentary Ombudsman took the initiative to take a closer look at the supervisory councils.243 The Parliamentary Ombudsman submitted its opinion in 2013 and concluded that the regime and the supervisory councils’ mandate suffered from several weaknesses. 244 The review showed that the various supervisory councils functioned in widely different ways, and that there appeared to be no reasonable grounds for many of the differences. There were differences, among other things, in the frequency of prison visits and in how supervision was exercised. It was pointed out that there did not appear to be any systematic effort on the part of the Directorate with a view to training or experience transfer between ­members who were finishing and starting their term of office. Special Report to the Storting Document 4:3 (2018–2019) The delayed appointment of some supervisory councils also meant that they were unable to get started on their tasks at the start of the period. No changes have been made to the supervisory regime after the above opinion was submitted, and the current regulations do not provide a clear framework for the mandate. Furthermore, there is no clear framework for how to conduct supervisory activities or how to handle specific queries from inmates, even though these are the most important parts of the supervisory councils’ work. The organisation of the supervisory councils was ­assessed again in connection with the reorganisation of the Correctional Service in 2016.245 In the bill and subsequent dialogue between the Directorate of the ­Norwegian Correctional Service and the Ministry of ­Justice and Public Security, doubts were raised ­concerning the ­independence of the regime. The D ­ irectorate has ­informed the Parliamentary ­Ombudsman of its submission of draft new guidelines for the supervisory councils to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in May 2017. 246 The Directorate reported on the supervisory councils in January 2019, on the order of the Ministry. The Parliamentary Ombudsman’s visits to high-security prisons during the period 2014–2018 and dialogue with the supervisory councils confirm the shortcomings of the supervisory regime. An unclear mandate, delayed appointment, lack of training and differences in working methods remain characteristic features of these councils. 11.1.2 Supervision of the prison health service and care for inmates in solitary confinement The supervisory councils report that many of the queries they receive concern matters relating to the prison health service.247 This is also evident from the supervisory ­councils’ annual reports.248 The supervisory councils are not tasked with supervising prison health services, however.249 240 Norwegian Official Report NOU 1988:37 (1988) Ny fengselslov (New Prison Act’) p. 95. Oslo: Ministry of Justice and the Police. 241 Ministry of Justice and the Police (2008). Straff som virker (’Punishment that works’), p. 199. Report to the Storting No 37 (2007–2008) Oslo: Ministry of Justice and the Police. 242 Combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of States parties due in 2011, submitted in response to the list of issues (CAT/C/NOR/Q/7) transmitted to the State party pursuant to the optional reporting procedure (A/62/44, paragraphs 23 and 24), p. 12. 243 The Parliamentary Ombudsman, Tilsynsrådene innen kriminalomsorgen (’The supervisory councils within the Correctional Service’), letter of 3 October 2011, the Correctional Service’s central administration. Off. ref. no 2011/225. 244 The Parliamentary Ombudsman’s Opinion (2013): Undersøkelse av tilsynsrådsordningen i kriminalomsorgen (’Investigation into the supervisory council regime in the Correctional Service’). Case no 2011/225 245 Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2016). Proposition to the Storting, including a draft bill – Prop. 105 L (2015–2016) 246 The Directorate of the Norwegian Correctional Service, letter of 24 May 2017 to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. 247 The Parliamentary Ombudsman’s Opinion (2013): Undersøkelse av tilsynsrådsordningen i kriminalomsorgen (’Investigation into the supervisory council regime in the Correctional Service’). Case no 2011/225. 248 Annual reports sent to the Parliamentary Ombudsman: The Supervisory Council for Correctional Service Region West: Annual reports 2016 and 2017; The Supervisory Council for Correctional Service Region South: Annual reports 2016 and 2017; The Supervisory Council for Correctional Service Region North: Annual reports 2016 and 2017. 249 The Ministry of Justice and the Police’s investigation into the supervisory councils for the Correctional Service for the years 2007–2009 – request for an opinion, letter of 12 January 2012 to the Parliamentary Ombudsman. Case no 2011/225. 79 The municipal authorities have administrative and ­professional responsibility for health and care services in prisons. The prison health service has a very ­important role to play in following up inmates who are held in solitary confinement or excluded from the company of other inmates. As described in Chapter 10 The health service’s follow-up of inmates in solitary c ­ onfinement, the Parliamentary ­Ombudsman has on several occasions criticised the prison health service’s follow up of inmates who are held in solitary confinement, excluded or otherwise have very ­limited ­possibilities of associating with other inmates. This ­includes criticism of the fact that inmates have not been attended to by medical personnel at least once a day, a requirement set out in the Directorate of the Norwegian Correctional Service’s guidelines and that, according to the Nelson Mandela Rules, applies to all inmates in solitary confinement. It has also been found that some prisons lack ­procedures for notifying the prison doctor without undue delay of any decision on exclusion from the company of other inmates, or that contact with the health service is not possible outside ‘office hours’. The county governors are tasked with supervising the health and care services and all medical personnel providing health and care services within their respective counties. The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision is the supervisory authority for the healthcare professions. Regular supervision is not carried out of the prison health services in Norway, however. The most recent nationwide supervisory activity was carried out by the county ­medical officers 18 years ago (2001). Follow-up of inmates in solitary confinement or excluded from the company of other inmates was not part of this system audit.250 11.2 Complaints procedure and the possibility of getting administrative decisions reviewed Human rights standards on complaints mechanisms Under the Nelson Mandela Rules, the use of solitary confinement shall be subject to independent review.251 ­Effective external systems are also required for dealing with complaints and reviewing individual cases.252 The ­European Prison Rules state that all inmates who are subjected to safety or security measures such as solitary confinement have the right to complain.253 If the complaint is rejected, the grounds for this shall be stated and the inmate shall have the right to appeal the decision to an independent authority. The rules are based on case law from the E ­ uropean Court of Human Rights concerning the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.254 The appeal process shall lead to a final binding decision by an authority that is independent of the prison service.255 In its consideration of complaints mechanisms in the Member States, the CPT has emphasised independence and the inmate’s access to participate in the complaints procedure.256 Independent complaints bodies should be ‘unconnected and separate’ from the agencies responsible for persons deprived of their liberty. According to the committee, ‘It is essential that they are (...) seen to be, independent’. Inmates deprived of their liberty should have direct, secure and confidential access to complaints mechanisms that process complaints promptly, thoroughly and effectively.257 According to the European Prison Rules, prisoners are entitled to seek legal advice about complaints and appeals procedures and to legal assistance ‘when the interests of justice require’.258 250 Norwegian Board of Health Supervision (2002). Fylkeslegenes tilsyn med helsetjenestene i fengsler 2001 – oppsummeringsrapport (’The county medical officers��� supervision of the prison health service 2001 – summary report’). https://www.helsetilsynet.no/globalassets/opplastinger/ publikasjoner/rapporter2002/fylkeslegenes_tilsyn_helsetjenesten_fengsler2001_oppsummeringsrapport_rapport_042002.pdf 251 The Nelson Mandela Rules, Rule 45(1): ’Solitary confinement shall ... be subject to independent review’. 252 ECHR Articles 6, 9 and 13. The European Prison Rules, Rules 70.1, 92 and 93. The Nelson Mandela Rules, Rules 56, 57 and 84 253 The European Prison Rules, Rule 53.7. 254 ECtHR 12 March 2008 Rodic and Three Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, paragraph 58. 255 Revised commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec (2006) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules, European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC), Council for Penological Co-operation, Strasbourg 22. May 2018, PC-CP (2018) 1 Rev. 2, p. 58. 256 Council of Europe: Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), Report to the United Kingdom Government on the visit to United Kingdom 1994, CPT/Inf (1996) 11, and Report to the Dutch Government on the visit to the Netherlands 1992, CPT/Inf (1993) 15, paragraph 55. 257 Council of Europe: Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), 27th General Report 2017, CPT/Inf (2018) 4. 258 The European Prison Rules, Rule 70.7.