The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area groups, such as juveniles,17 persons with mental disabilities,18 pregnant women, elderly persons and persons sentenced after an unfair trial,19 are considered particularly cruel and inhuman, regardless of the specific methods of implementation or other attendant circumstances. Although international law does not attribute a different value to the right to life of these particular groups, it holds that the imposition of the death penalty in such cases per se is a violation of the prohibition of torture. These standards are based on the established belief that the execution of such persons is inherently cruel. The prohibition on the execution of juveniles is also considered a jus cogens norm, an imperative rule that binds all states. Similarly, an increasing number of regional and domestic courts, including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United States Supreme Court, have held that the mandatory death penalty, where judges have no discretion to consider aggravating or mitigating circumstances with respect to the crime or the offender, violates due process and amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.20 These standards and practices also illustrate a developing global trend to reconsider capital punishment in all cases as an intrinsic violation of the prohibition of torture or other ill-treatment. I am convinced that the rigorous conditions applied to the imposition of the death penalty under international law and that the burden is on states to prove that the surrounding circumstances, including the method of execution, do not violate the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, make retention of this punishment not only costly and impractical, but almost impossible. These requirements include strict due-process guarantees, restrictions on the specific methods of execution, prevention of the “death row phenomenon” and other related circumstances, and the prohibition on execution of individuals with certain characteristics. Even with such conditions in place, however, states cannot guarantee that standards and conditions imposed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Articles 1 and 16 of the Convention against Torture (CAT) in regards to particular methods of implementation of execution and other related circumstances will not be violated in each case. 17  For the case of juveniles see Domingues v. United States, Rep. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, No. 62/02, paras. 84-87 (2002) <http://cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.12285.htm>; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), <https:// www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/04pdf/03-633.pdf>. 18  See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the question of the death penalty, E/CN.4/RES/2003/67, <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=5021>; United States Supreme Court, Atkins v. Virginia, 20 June 2002, No. 00-8452, 536 U.S. 304, <http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supremecourt/536/304.html>. 19  See United Nations Human Rights Committee, Baboheram-Adhin v. Suriname, Comms. Nos. 148-154/1983 (1985),<http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/348>; United Nations Human Rights Committee, Pratt v. Jamaica, Comms Nos. 210 & 225 (1986) (1987), <http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/308>; Bader v. Sweden, ECtHR Application no, 13284/04 (2005), <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70841#{“itemid”:[“001-70841”]}>; Öcalan v. Turkey, ECtHR, application no. 46221/99, 12 May 2005 (Grand Chamber), <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ eng?i=001-142086#{“itemid”:[“001-142086”]}>. 20 See Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280 (1976), <http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/428/280. html>; Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, Series C, No. 94, paras. 167,168 (2002), <http://www. corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_94_ing.pdf>. 10