torture, and holding other criminal justice actors to account.173 If, instead, judges are pressured to ensure that the majority, if not all, cases result in convictions, their ability to perform these functions fairly and impartially is undeniably compromised. 80. Pressure can come from a range of actors, including other criminal justice actors, such as prosecutors and police. In one Eastern European OSCE participating State it is reported that prosecutors exert pressure on judges to convict, and the acquittal rate is from one to two per cent.174 Pressure can also be exerted by government officials or judicial authorities. In another OSCE participating State in the same region it was reported that, the practice of “telephone justice”, where judges are directly instructed by the court president how to resolve a specific case, operates “as a matter of routine”.175 In this country, the acquittal rate is alarmingly low, at just 0.23 per cent.176 According to the survey, specialized CSOs that have worked with torture victims in this country for over 15 years are not aware of any case where a judge has excluded evidence on the basis that it was obtained by torture.177 It is reported that the powers of the prosecution (a relic of the Soviet system), are such that judges may face dismissal if they are seen as not being sufficiently “attentive” to the prosecution’s demands.178 81. The legal framework for the prevention of torture cannot be effective in practice if the actors who must implement that legal framework are constrained or significantly dis-incentivized from implementing it in practice. More work is needed to reform criminal justice systems that are reliant on quantitative indicators for the performance of criminal justice actors, including the manner in which these systems may also affect the independence and impartiality of criminal justice actors. Where the need to fulfil performance indicators by police results in torture or other ill-treatment, and the need for prosecutors to secure convictions exists, it is clear that this is likely to result in prosecutors and judges failing to protect suspects or accused person from torture or other ill-treatment, and to prevent the use of torture-tainted evidence. 173 See, for example, ICJ, “The role of judges, lawyers, and prosecutors in preventing torture”, (October 2017). 174 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, ”Why Ukraine acquits 10 times less often than in Stalin’s Soviet Union”, (2016). 175 ICJ, “Russian Federation: Independence and impartiality; Judicial integrity and accountability”, (2014). 176 Questionnaire response Public Verdict Foundation (Russia) (2019). 177 Ibid. 178 ICJ, op. cit., note 175. 51