CCPR/C/128/D/2707/2015 Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 7.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 97 of its rules of procedure, whether it is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 7.3 The Committee takes note of the claim that the author has exhausted all available effective domestic remedies. In the absence of any objection by the State party in this connection, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol have been met. 7.4 In the Committee’s view, the author has sufficiently substantiated, for the purposes of admissibility, her claims raising issues under articles 6 and 7, read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3) (a), with regard to her son, and under article 7, read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3) (a), of the Covenant with regard to herself. Accordingly, it declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information submitted by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 8.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that her son died as a result of the illtreatment and torture inflicted by the police on 27 June 2009. The Committee also notes that two forensic medical examinations were performed. The first one indicated that the cause of death was mechanical asphyxiation provoked by the closure of the respiratory tract due to vomiting, while the second one indicated that the cause of death was a lifethreatening heart arrhythmia. The Committee notes that the State party denies any allegations of torture, while providing two alternative explanations of the circumstances of the death of the author’s son and claiming that he suffered from a heart disease during his lifetime. The Committee further notes that the State party does not contest the presence of external bodily injuries and accepts that they could have been the result of his resistance to the police officers, yet it claims that these “scratches” were unrelated to his death. However, the Committee observes that the State party does not support its position with proper documentary evidence. The Committee observes that the State party failed to furnish it with any results of the investigation into the death of the author’s son. For example, the State party claims to have questioned numerous witnesses, but has not provided the results of the questioning. It also remains unclear to the Committee whether the State party’s authorities questioned the author and the relatives and friend who witnessed her son’s body bearing multiple signs of severe ill-treatment and torture following his death. The Committee also notes that the State party accepts the fact that the author’s son was put forcefully into the police vehicle by six or seven police officers. The State party does not contest the author’s allegations that an eyewitness had testified in vain that the author’s son had not resisted the police and had not insulted police officers while being apprehended. 8.3 The Committee notes the author’s claim that the ill-treatment and torture of her son while he was being apprehended and transported in the special police vehicle led to the arbitrary deprivation of her son’s life, contrary to the principles enunciated by the Committee in Eshonov v. Uzbekistan. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence, according to which States parties, by arresting and detaining individuals, take responsibility to care for their life,5 and that criminal investigation and subsequent prosecution are necessary remedies for violations of human rights, such as those protected by article 6 of the 5 6 Lantsova v. Russian Federation (CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997), para. 9.2; Boboev v. Tajikistan (CCPR/C/120/D/2173/2012), para. 9.3; and the Committee’s general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, para. 29.