CCPR/C/128/D/2707/2015 problems. She also claims that her son’s blood test results were missing and it could not be established whose blood was on her son’s clothing. The police failed to explain how the results of the blood test had disappeared. On 25 July 2012, the case was closed for lack of corpus delicti. On 27 July 2012, the author appealed the decision to the General Prosecutor’s Office, but her appeal was dismissed. On the same day, the author appealed to the Ismoil Somoni District Court, which has yet to rule on the appeal. The author’s complaint has never been considered by an international or regional instance. 2.7 The author emphasizes that, before her son was apprehended by the police, he did not have a medical history or bodily injuries. When the vehicle arrived at the police station, however, his body was covered with bruises and he died soon afterwards. This fact, along with the method of transportation, separated from his friends, shows the police’s involvement in his death. The author submits that the injuries found on her son’s body cause her to believe that he was tortured and subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, which caused his death. The author submits that, according to the conclusion of the Committee in the case of Eshonov v. Uzbekistan,2 a death in any type of custody should be regarded as prima facie a summary or arbitrary execution, and there should be a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation to confirm or rebut the presumption, especially when complaints by relatives or other reliable reports suggest unnatural death. 2.8 The author notes that, for more than five years, the State party failed to conduct an impartial and thorough investigation into her son’s death. Moreover, the author emphasizes that, during that period, she had very limited access to the case file. She considers that the police authorities are involved in destroying the evidence, such as her son’s blood samples. 2.9 The author explains that, for five years, she has been living in a state of constant psychological stress, as no effective investigation of her son’s death has ever been conducted and she has received no updates on the different investigations. The complaint 3.1 The author claims that the State party has violated her son’s rights under articles 6 and 7, read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3) (a), of the Covenant. She also claims a violation of her rights under article 7, read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3) (a), of the Covenant. The author refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence in Telitsina v. Russian Federation 3 and its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant in support of her argument that failure to conduct a thorough investigation of her son’s death in custody constitutes a violation of article 6, in conjunction with article 2 (3), of the Covenant. 3.2 The author requests that the Committee oblige the State party to conduct an impartial investigation into the facts of her son’s death, to compensate her for moral damages and to provide her with adequate rehabilitation. State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits 4.1 In a note verbale dated 17 February 2016, the State party submitted its observations on admissibility and the merits. It submits that the Prosecutor General’s Office has assessed the author’s complaint concerning her son’s death. The investigation revealed that, on 27 June 2009, at 11 p.m. in Dushanbe, the Government’s motorcade unit was escorting the President’s car and was securing the route assisted by the police. At that moment, the author’s son, being drunk and in violation of public order laws, began using obscene language against the law enforcement officers. In order to establish his identity and the reasons for his behaviour, the police officers apprehended him, and placed him inside a police vehicle to take him to the police department of the Ismoil Somoni district. Upon arrival at the police department, it was established that the author’s son had died on the way. 2 3 CCPR/C/99/D/1225/2003, para. 9.2. See CCPR/C/80/D/888/1999. 3