V. HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY IN PRETRIAL DETENTION A. Separation and treatment in accordance with the right to the presumption of innocence 244. As has been noted throughout this report, the principle of the presumption of innocence is the point of departure for any analysis of the rights and 342 treatment accorded to persons in pretrial detention. This right is not only the guiding principle in deciding on the application of this measure, but also has concrete implications on the conditions of detention to which the pretrial detainee is 343 In this regard, international law provides first and foremost for the subjected. segregation of convicted and accused persons, and for the detention regime of the accused to be qualitatively different in some ways to that of the convicted. 245. With regard to the difference in nature between pretrial detention and the deprivation of liberty resulting from a conviction, the Commission has held that in light of the principle of proportionality, an innocent person shall not receive an equal or worse treatment than a convicted one. The relationship between pretrial detention period and the length of a sentence for purposes of computing relevant detention 344 periods should not taken to mean that they are equivalent in nature. 246. Accordingly, as provided for under Article 5.4 of the American Convention, which is analogous to Article 10.2(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, States should establish as a general rule, except in emergency 345 situations, the separation between the accused and the convicted. This provision is not merely a recommendation or simply a best practice, but rather a binding obligation arising from a treaty. In fact, the Inter-American Court has consistently found a violation of Article 5.4 of the Convention in cases where it has been proven that victims were held 346 in detention together with convicted persons. 342 IACHR, Fifth Report on the Human Rights Situation in Guatemala, Ch. VII, para. 32. 343 Similarly, the Inter-American Court has recognized that “[t]hese guarantees can be understood as a corollary of the right of the accused person to be presumed innocent,” and the United Nations Human Rights Committee has held that segregation of the convicted from the accused is “required in order to emphasize their status as unconvicted persons; who at the same time enjoy the right to be presumed innocent.” I/A Court HR., Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, para. 146; and UN, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 21: Humane Treatment of Persons Deprived of Liberty, approved at the 44th Session (1992), para. 9. In Compilation of General comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies Volume I, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol.I) approved on May 27, 2008, p. 243. 344 IACHR, Report No. 86/09, case 12.553, Merits. Jorge, José and Dante Peirano Basso, Uruguay, August 6, 2009, para. 109. 345 This provision also appears in the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Rules 8.8 and 85.1); and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Principle 8). 346 I/A Court HR., Case of Pacheco Teruel et al v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment April 27, 2012. Series C No. 241, para. 60; I/A Court HR., Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haití. Merits, Continues…