50 interests is to do what is expected of them, even when no one has directly or expressly 165 asked them to do so. 114. In Peru, for example, it has been documented that the Internal Control Office of the Magistrature (OCMA), headed by a member of the Supreme Court, set about issuing public announcements of disciplinary proceedings opened against judges 166 who failed to order pretrial detention or who granted bail. Information has also been received indicating that Ecuador’s Judicature Council “has maintained high levels of influence over judges’ decisions, thanks to the number of administrative proceedings opened in recent times.” Notably, in one of those proceedings, one of the members of the Magistrature Council spoke publicly about “the regulatory interpretation that should 167 be used to decide on pretrial detention.” 115. The IACHR acknowledges the importance of judges’ participation in discussions of general legal matters and of more specific topics. However, it reiterates the comments made by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers: “As such, judges need to preserve the dignity of their office and the 168 impartiality and independence of the judiciary.” 116. The IACHR notes that the official position of many States is to downplay the phenomenon of inappropriate pressure on judges’ work to equate it with the commission of a crime or misdemeanor, when they are not necessarily comparable concepts. Clearly, threats and other kinds of criminally punishable acts are the most serious manifestations of this interference, but there are also other types of pressure that, while they do not constitute offenses, do serve to undermine the rule of law and judicial independence. Public officials and authorities have the same right of free expression as other citizens. However, their public statements must not affect the normal operations of public institutions. There can be no pressure from the agencies of the State: any form of pressure is interference in the work of judges that affects the quality of the rule of law. For that reason, the Commission conducts broad analyses of 165 Information received by the IACHR at the Thematic Hearing on Judicial Independence and Preventive Prison in the Americas, 147th regular period of sessions, organized by Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF), Institute of Law and Society (CIDES), Institute of Legal Defense (IDL), and DeJusticia, March 16, 2013. See also IACHR Regional Meeting of Experts on Pretrial Detention, May 9 and 10, 2013, presentation by Luis Pásara, available in Spanish at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/ppl/actividades/prisionpreventiva.asp. 166 This matter was raised at the Thematic Hearing on Judicial Independence and Preventive Prison in the Americas, 147th regular session, organized by Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF), Institute of Law and Society (CIDES), Institute of Legal Defense (IDL), and DeJusticia, March 16, 2013; at the IACHR Regional Meeting of Experts on Pretrial Detention, May 9 and 10, 2013, presentation by Luis Pásara; and in DPLF, Insufficient Judicial Independence, Distorted Pretrial Detention: The Cases of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, 2013, pp. 170 and 171. 167 DPLF, Insufficient Judicial Independence, Distorted Pretrial Detention: The Cases of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, 2013, p. 133. 168 UN, Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Report on the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, A/HRC/11/41, published March 24, 2009, para. 45.